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MILLER V. CALIFORNIA:
A COLD SHOWER FOR THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
The first amendment of the Constitution provides that "Congress
shall make no Law ... abridging the Freedom of Speech, or of the
Press.... ."1 Judicial construction of this provision, however, has al-
lowed governmental regulation of the content of some speech as a
proper exercise of authority. Libelous speech,2 or speech which advo-
cates the violent overthrow of the government or interference with its
operations3 has been found to be without first amendment protection.
Relying upon social and legal history, the Supreme Court has con-
cluded that "obscene" speech or writing is not protected by the constitu-
tional umbrella of first amendment guarantees. 4 The Court concluded
that because obscenity is bereft of any value or importance it should
not be considered speech at all, and thus need not be afforded constitu-
tional protection.5
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Prior to the mid-nineteenth century influence of Victorian philos-
ophy, pornographic literature flourished in England and the United
States. 6 Obscenity prosecutions were extremely rare. The first reported
I U.S. CoNsr. amend. I. The first amendment's prohibition against the passage of any
law which abridges the freedom of expression is made applicable to the states by the
fourteenth amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
2 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). As libel is outside the area of protected
speech, any attempt to redeem it through a balancing of evils or a dear and present
danger test is inappropriate. The Court analogized libelous utterances to obscene speech,
and found both totally unprotected from government regulation and without any pos-
sibility of redemption. Id. at 266.
3 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616
(1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Under the "dear and present danger"
test, the Government may suppress this type of advocacy since such speech is likely to
create serious evils which Congress has the power to prevent. Or, employing a balancing test
which weighs the right of free speech against the evil created by it, the Court may find
that the presence of the created evil clearly outweighs the danger of limiting free speech.
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951). Political speech is afforded greater safe-
guards than libelous or obscene utterances, unless it can be shown that the former has
created a fervor which will likely result in "imminent lawless action." Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
4 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957). The Court relied heavily upon the
existence of numerous state and federal statutes and international agreements which
prohibited obscenity. Id. at 485. Although this was the first case which squarely presented
the question of whether or not obscene speech is protected by the Constitution, the
Court was influenced by earlier decisions which had assumed that obscenity was not
constitutionally protected. Id. at 481. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973);
United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 354 (1971).
5 See notes 32-33 and accompanying text supra.
6 United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm Film, 413 US. 123, 131-35 (1973)
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case involving obscenity was decided in 1663. In Sir Charles Sydlyes'
Case, the defendant, charged with obscene conduct, was fined for "shew-
ing himself naked in a balkony."7 In colonial America, obscenity laws
were generally restricted to punishing the crimes of blasphemy and
profanity.8 Under the common law crime of obscene-libel, Connecticut,
in the early nineteenth century, punished the depiction of a "monster."9
Vermont, in 1821, enacted the first state law which prohibited the pub-
lication or sale of "lewd or obscene" materials. 10 At the federal level,
(Douglas, J., dissenting). In England, under the Stuarts and Tudors, censorship by the
government was limited to blasphemous or treasonous utterances. Obscenity was a moral
question to be resolved by the ecclesiastical courts and not the common law courts. Books
such as John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure, William King's The Toast, and
Harris' List of Covent Garden Ladies (an advertising catalogue for prostitutes) were
openly circulated for common reading. During this period in America, Benjamin Franklin
wrote his Advice to a Young Man on Choosing a Mistress. D. LOTH, Tim EROTIC IN Lrr-
EnATuE 108 (1961); N. ST. JOHN-STsvAs, OBSCENrrY AND THE LAw 25 (1956).
7 83 Eng. Rep. 1146, 1147 (K.B. 1663). This case was not interpreted as a precedent
for the suppression of obscene literature but was confined, in later decisions, to the crime
of indecent exposure or criminal breach of the peace. United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels
of Super 8mm Film, 413 US. 123, 134 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Sydlyes is indicative
of the common law court's viewpoint that it must "penalize conduct that is grossly offen-
sive to the public." REPORT OF THE Coma'N ON OBSCENITY AND PoNoGRAPHY 350 (N.Y.
Times ed. 1970). See, e.g., Bradlaugh v. Regina, [1878] 3 Q.B. 569, 634; Rex v. Curl,
93 Eng. Rep. 849, 851 (K.B. 1727).
8 United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm Film, 413 U.S. 123, 134 n.4 (1973);
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482-83 (1954). E.g., the Massachusetts Bay Colony
prohibited the "composing, writing, printing or publishing of any filthy, obscene, or
profane song, pamphlet, libel or mock-sermon, in imitation or in mimicking of preaching,
or any other part of Divine Worship." Acts & Laws of the Province of Massachusetts Bay,
c. CV, § 8 (1712), MAssAcHusErrs BAY COLONY CHARTER & LAws 399 (1814). In 1821, in
Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 336 (1821), the defendant was convicted of publishing
obscene literature, vz, John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure, based upon
this colonial statute and the common law. This was one of the earliest decisions which
deviated from the blasphemy standard and attempted to describe obscenity in a sexual
context.
9 Knowles v. State, 3 Day 103 (Conn. 1808). The defendant exhibited a sign deemed
indecent for showing a "horrid and unnatural monster" which had no eyes, whose ears
were misplaced and whose skin was copper-colored. What is "obscene" varies with the
philosophical and cultural development of society. In colonial times, "obscene" generally
referred to blasphemous utterances. See, e.g., Acts 9- Laws of the Province of Massachusetts
Bay, c. CV, § 8 (1712), MAssAcnusErrs BAY COLONY CHARTER & LAws 399 (1814). In the
nineteenth century it described something which depicted violence or the supernatural.
See, e.g., Knowles v. State, 3 Day 103 (Conn. 1808). In the twentieth century, obscenity
centers around matters with sexually erotic themes. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476 (1957).
10 [1824] laws of Vt., 1 c. XXXII, no. I, § 23. Subsequently, in 1834, Connecticut enacted
an obscenity statute, STATs. OF CONN. 182-84, and, in 1835, Massachusetts amended and
departed from its religious definition of obscenity. MAss. Rv. STAT., ch. 130, § 10 (1835).
The first American prosecution for obscenity involving sexually explicit material occurred
prior to any state legislative enactment. In Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2 S. & R. 91, 92
(Pa. 1815), a defendant was convicted under the common law of Pennsylvania for ex-
hibiting obscene pictures. There, "obscene" was described under the more modern
approach as "lewd, wicked, scandalous, infamous, . . . and indecent posture with a
woman." By the end of the nineteenth century, at least 30 states had some general type of
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although the Tariff Act of 184211 was the earliest prohibition against
lewd-obscene materials, it was not until the enactment of the Comstock
Act' 2 in 1870 that the Government took an activist role in suppressing
obscenity. Today, both federal and state governments regulate porno-
graphic material under the theory that it is necessary to protect their
citizens from the harmful effects attending the dissemination or ex-
obscenity statute and by the time of the Roth decision every state had one. Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 104-05 (1973).
11 Customs Law of 1842, c. 270, § 28, 5 Stat. 566, amended, Act of March 2, 1857, ch.
63, 11 Stat. 168, repealed, Act of March 3, 1933, ch. 202, 47 Stat. 1430. Section 28 of the
1842 act prohibited the "importation of all indecent and obscene prints, printings, litho-
graphs, engravings, and transparencies." The power of the Federal Government to regulate
the importation of "indecent prints" was recognized in Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S.
(5 How.) 608, 628 (1847).
19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1970) is the current principal governmental weapon against the
importation of obscene material. Such material is classified as "immoral articles" as are
lottery tickets, drugs, articles for abortion, or any type of book or pamphlet advocating
the overthrow of the Government. See United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm
Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973), which upheld the validity of section 1305(a) in light of the
Miller holding.
In England, it was not until 1853 that Parliament enacted anti-obscenity legislation.
The Customs Consolidation Act of 1853, 16 & 17 Vict., ch. 107, was passed to prevent the
importation of obscene French postcards. THE REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON OBscENrrY AND
PORNOGRAPHY 351 (N.Y. Times ed. 1970). Four years later, under Lord Cambell's Act of
1857, 20 & 21 Vict., ch. 83, the Government outrightly banned obscene literature. 413 U.S.
123, 133 n.3 (1973).
12 Act of 1872, ch. 335, § 148, 17 Stat. 283, amended, Act of March 3, 1873, ch. 258,
§ 2, 17 Stat. 598. This law placed internal limitations on obscene materials by making
their mailing a criminal act. In Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878), the Supreme Court
upheld the validity of this obscenity statute under the power of the Government to reg-
ulate the mails and to prohibit the transportation of "corrupting publications," which
"have a demoralizing influence upon the people." Id. at 736. See Rosen v. United States,
161 U.S. 29 (1896). In United States v. Bennett, 24 F. Cas. 1093, 1100 (No. 14,571) (S.D.N.Y.
1879), the Act of 1876, § 1, 19 Stat. 90, which prohibited the mailing of any obscene or
indecent publication, was found not to be repugnant to the Constitution. Justice Blatch-
ford reflected upon the relationship of free speech and press to the publication and dis-
tribution of obscene literature, and concluded that:
Freelovers and freethinkers have a right to their views, and they may express
them, and they may publish them; but they cannot publish them in connection
with obscene matter, and then send them through the mails.., without violating
the law.
Id. at 1101. The relationship between freedom of expression and governmental restrictions
on the mailing of obscene materials was again seriously considered in United States v.
Harmon, 45 F. 414 (D. Kan. 1891). There the court recognized the need for protecting
the right to express private opinions. The court found that although there is a necessary
privilege, it is not without limits. There is a boundary line which the government may,
in its proper authority, establish between the permissible and the prohibited. The
boundary line, although stated to be where what is published "outrages the common
sense of decency, or endangers the public safety," was not specifically defined. Id. at 416.
The current postal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970), which prohibits knowing use of
the mails for the delivery of obscene literature, was held constitutional in Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). The dissemination of obscene materials through the mails,
even to willing adults, is also without constitutional protection. United States v. Reidel,
402 U.S. 351 (1971).




hibition of such material - notwithstanding that the "adverse effects"
of exposure to such matter remains an unsettled question.13
Defining Obscenity
What is obscene and what is not? "Obscene" is derived from the
Latin word obscaenus; ob meaning "to," and caenum meaning "filth."14
The dictionary defines obscene to be that which is "disgusting to the
senses ... grossly repugnant to the generally accepted notions of what
is appropriate... [or] offensive or revolting as countering or violating
some idea or principle."'15 Pornography is of Greek derivation from the
words porn meaning "harlot," and graphos meaning "writing."'1 Por-
nography is defined as a "description of prostitutes or prostitution...
[or] a depiction (as in writing or painting) of licentiousness or lewdness:
a portrayal of erotic behavior designed to cause sexual excitement."'17
When does a literary or artistic work extend beyond the bound-
aries of social acceptability and edge into the sphere of pornography? 8
A precise standard or formula has never been developed to make this
determination. This imprecision has allowed the definition of obscenity
Psychological and physiological studies have indicated that people do become sexually
aroused from reading obscene materials. F. WEmRaAm, SEDuCTION OF THE INNOCENT 164
(1954). But the relationships among obscenity, sexual arousal, and anti-social behavior
are constantly debated. It is typically claimed that obscene materials do induce anti-social
conduct in the average person and thus should be prohibited. See, e.g., J. KiLPATRiGc,
THE SAirr PEDLR (1960). Another author suggests that pornographic material is a po-
tentially disruptive force in the community due to its deleterious effect upon mental
health. P. SoRoKN, THE AmmEuCAN SEX REVOLUTION (1956). The Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation has found a direct correlation between pornography and the increase in the num-
ber of violent sex crimes. Hoover, Combating Merchants of Filth: The Role of the FBI,
25 U. Prrr. L REv. 469 (1964). The harmful effects of obscenity have been the subject of
numerous works. See L K-.E-KErrH, THE HIGH PRICE OF PORNOGRAPHY (1961); C. RoLrH,
Does PORNOGRAPHY MATrER? (1961), Blount, Pornography and its Effect on Society, 44
FLA. B.J. 518 (1970).
Behavioral scientists, however, have found no link between arousal from exposure to
pornography and anti-social conduct. See Cairns, Paul & Wishner, Sex Censorship: The
Assumptions of Anti-Obscenity Laws and the Empirical Evidence, 46 MINN. L. REv. 1009,
1034 (1962). In fact, it has been theorized that pornography actually prevents violent sex
crimes. Murphy, The Value of Pornography, 10 WAYNE L. REv. 655, 661 (1964); Fak, The
Roth Decision in the Light of Sociological Knowledge, 54 A.B.A.J. 288, 290 (1968). The
Commission on Obscenity and Pornography concluded that obscenity neither corrupts the
character of an individual, intensifies anti-social tendencies, nor increases the number of
violent sex crimes committed. THE REPonr OF THE COMM'N ON OBscENrry AND PORNOG-
RAPHY 256-57 (N.Y. Times ed. 1970).
14 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18 n.2 (1973).
'5 Waas-rR's Trnm NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY 1557 (1969). The Oxford English
Dictionary defines obscene as "[o]ffensive to the senses, or to taste or refinement; disgust-
ing, repulsive, filthy, foul, abominable, loathsome."
16 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18 n.2 (1973).
17WEBsTr's Tuam NEw INTERNATONAL DIcIONARY 1767 (1969). In this note, obscene
(obscenity) and pornographic (pornography) are used synonymously. It is, however, more
precise to treat pornography as a subcategory of the larger class of obscenity. Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 18-19 (1973).
18 There is a "dim and uncertain line" that separates obscenity from constitutionally
protected expression. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963).
1974)
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to evolve gradually, the effort generally being made to base it upon
prevailing notions of decency, 19 i.e., the consideration being whether
the subject matter is offensive to modesty or decency.20
Recently, in Miller v. California,2 1 the Supreme Court attempted
to formulate "concrete guidelines to isolate 'hardcore' pornography
from expression protected by the First Amendment." In delivering the
Court's opinion, Chief Justice Burger described obscene works to be
ones which
[when] "applying contemporary community standards," ... appeal
to the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a
patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.2
The Court determined that the term "contemporary community stan-
dards" referred not to a national standard, but to one based upon the
local community.23
Developing a Standard
The earliest definitive standard of obscenity was enunciated in
Regina v. Hicklin.24 Under the Hicklin test, a publication was judged
to be obscene based upon the effect of individual, isolated excerpts
upon particularly susceptible persons.25 Hicklin has led a checkered
19 People v. Richmond County News, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 578, 586, 175 N.E.2d 681, 685,
216 N.Y.S.2d 369, 375 (1961), citing Brown v. Kingsley Books, 1 N.Y.2d 177, 181-82, 134
N.E.d 461, 462-63, 151 N.Y.S.2d 639, 641-42 (1956), aff'd, 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
20 Commonwealth v. Landis, 8 Phila. 453, 454 (1870). A publication is obscene if it
tends to create "lascivious desires," id., or if it is offensive to chastity. Davidson v. State,
19 Ala. App. 77, 95 So. 54 (1923). It has been described as "sexually impure or filthy,"
Excelsior Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 3 N.Y.2d 287, 240, 144 N.E.2d 31, 33, 165 N.Y.S.2d 42,
44 (1957), or as that which "smacks . . . of sexual perversion and sickness," People v.
Richmond County News, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 578, 587, 175 N.E.2d 681, 686, 216 N.Y.S.2d 369,
876 (1961). The Supreme Court, in 1957, defined obscene as "material which deals with
sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest." Roth v. United States, 854 U.S. 476, 487
(1957).
21 418 U.S. 15, 29 (1978).
22 Id. at 24.
23 Id. at 30-84. Contra, Jacobellis v. Ohio, 878 U.S. 184, 192-95 (1964) (standard based
upon the community at large-a national standard).
24 [1868] 8 Q.B. 860. A pamphlet entitled "The Confessional Unmasked" which showed
"the depravity of the Romish priesthood, the iniquity of the Confessional, and the ques-
tions put to females in confession," was seized as obscene. Id. at 862.
25 Id. at 371. The test was
whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt
those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a
publication of this sort may fall.
In rejecting the defendant's contention that a book cannot be obscene unless the motive
of the publisher was to make it so, the court found that it is immaterial whether or not
the book was intended to provide an educational experience. "Obscenity is to be judged
by the objective tendency of the material . . . and not by the motives or intentions of the
author." H. CLOR, OBScENrr AND THE PUBLIC MoRALrrY 16-17 (1969).
[Vol. 48:568
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existence in American courts, being affirmed by some26 and, in more
recent times, disregarded by others.27 Criticism of the rule is based on
two grounds. First, emphasis on those most susceptible to the unde-
sirable effects of questionable excerpts instead of on the average adult
population tends to restrict available reading material to that fit for
children.28 Second, it tends to proscribe matters legitimately dealing
with sex and, thus, infringes upon the constitutional guarantees of free
speech and press.29
In 1957, the Supreme Court, aware of the flaws and unworkability
of the Hicklin test, attempted to formulate a "better" definition of
obscenity. In Roth v. United States, and its companion case, Alberts v.
California,"0 the Court acknowledged that all ideas, be they controver-
sial or unorthodox, are afforded complete constitutional protection as
long as they possess even the slightest degree of "redeeming social im-
portance," and are subject to censorship only when they infringe upon
26 See, e.g., Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29, 43 (1896); United States v. Bennett,
24 Cas. 1093, 1103-05 (No. 14,571) (S.D.N.Y. 1879); Commonwealth v. Buckley, 200 Mass.
346, 86 N.E. 910 (1909). Although the above mentioned cases are somewhat dated, the
test has been employed as late as 1953. See, e.g., Besig v. United States, 208 F.2d 142, 145
(9th Cir. 1953) (a written work which is of high literary merit is objectionable if obscenity
is a part of such work).
27 See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 US. 476, 489 (1957); United States v. One Book
Entitled Ulysses, 72 F.2d 705, 707-08 (2d Cir. 1934); American Civil Liberties Union v.
Chicago, 3 Ill. 2d 334, 121 N.E.2d 585, 591-92 (1954). Infrequent instances or episodes of
obscenity will not result in condemnation unless the context of the entire book is based
upon sexual adventures or mis-adventures. There must be a weighing of the affirmative
value of the literary work against its objectionable aspects to determine if in the aggregate
the work is intended purely to excite sexual desires. Id.
28 Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383-84 (1957). Although the object of the state's
action was to protect juveniles from books which were potentially injurious to their
innocence, the impact of the law was to ban all books available to the general public.
unless suitable to youths. Id. This is not to say, however, that all laws which establish
different standards of obscenity for children and adults should be void. In Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), the Court found it constitutionally permissible for a state
to modify its obscenity statutes to restrict minors' rights to access to sexually explicit
materials more severely than the rights of adults. But a state's right to adjust obscenity
standards where minors are involved is limited by the requirement that the applicable
state law be definite and carefully limit any discretion on the part of the statutes admin-
istrator. The fact that children are involved does not alter the requirement of specificity
in laws. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 US. 676, 688-90 (1968); United States v.
Kennerley, 209 F. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913); Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, 59 Cal. 2d 901, 912-13, 383
P.2d 152, 159-60, 31 Cal. Rptr. 800, 807-08 (1963); People v. Richmond County News, Inc.,
9 N.Y.2d 578, 585, 175 N.E.2d 681, 684, 216 N.Y.S.2d 369, 874 (1961).
29 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957). The coarseness and harshness of
certain passages aid in the depiction of matter by giving fuller expression and meaning
to the artist's words. These isolated passages, important as tools of the artist, should not
be used to condemn the entire work as obscene. Zeitlin v. Arneberg, 59 Cal. 2d 901, 912-13,
383 P.2d 152, 159-60, 31 Cal. Rptr. 800, 807-08 (1963).
80 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Roth, who was prosecuted for mailing obscene circulars and
advertisements in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970), contested the constitutionality of
the statute. Alberts attacked the validity of a state penal statute, CAL. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 311 (West 1955), which prohibited the sale or advertising of obscene or indecent material.
1974]
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areas of "more important interests."' But, Mr. Justice Brennan, deliver-
ing the Court's opinion, emphasized that obscenity is "utterly without
redeeming social importance '3 2 and is thus outside the area of consti-
tutionally protected freedoms. 33
The Roth Court then proceeded to attack the definitional prob-
lem. Sex and obscenity were found not to be interchangeable, as the
mere appearance of sex in a literary, artistic, or scientific work did not
perforce result in condemnation of the material as obscene. 34 Material
is obscene, and denied constitutional safeguard, when "to the average
person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."'3 5
In succeeding sessions, the Court attempted to clarify its obscenity
guidelines. Customarily, the Roth decision was reiterated and then
refined.
31354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). See, e.g., Kingsley Int'l Picture Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S.
684, 687-88 (1959) (New York's refusal to issue a license to show the motion picture Lady
Chatterley's Lover because of its favorable depiction of adultery resulted in the striking
down of the license requirement statute as unconstitutional); Near v. Minnesota, 283 Us.
697 (1931) (existence of strong notions of liberty and freedom of the press recognized by
the Court, and only in exceptional situations will courts be allowed to infringe upon these
ideas). In Near, the Court refused to enjoin publication of a "possibly" defamatory peri-
odical. There, the need for freedom of expression outweighed the injurious effects of the
subject speech. There are, however, limited times, e.g., during wartime where the pro-
posed speech pertains to the movement of troops or war materials, when speech can be
limited prior to its publication. In these cases, the danger caused by the speech dearly
outweighs the right of the individual to speak. Id.
32 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the pre-
vention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Consti-
tutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene .... It has been well
observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and
are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality . . ..
Id. at 485, quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (emphasis
added). Chaplinsky also represents another class of speech which because of its contents
is, like libelous utterances, without constitutional protection. "Fighting-words" which
cause "immediate breach of the peace," cannot be considered communication and are
thus not safeguarded from state regulation. Id. at 572.
33 354 US. 476, 485 (1957).
34 Id. at 487.
35 Id. at 489. The "average person" and "dominant theme" criteria judicially buried
the Hicklin test. Justice Brennan realized the imprecision and generality of such a stan-
dard, but concluded that it was not in violation of due process as it provided sufficient
warning of the proscribed conduct. Id. at 491. Soon afterward, the Court demonstrated
that it would take a narrow view in applying this potentially broad definition to determine
what should be considered obscene. See, e.g., One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 US. 371 (1958), -revg
241 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1957); Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 355 US. 35 (1957), rev'g per
curiam 244 F.2d 432 (7th Cir.); Mounce v. United States, 355 U.S. 180 (1957), reu'g per
curiam 247 F.2d 148 (9th Cir.); Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Develop-
ing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. Rav. 5, 35 (1960). Much has been written about
the Roth decision and its impact. See, e.g., Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Ob-
scenity, 1960 Sup. Cr. REv. 1 (1960); 7 AM. U.L. R.. 39 (1958).
[Vol. 48:568
MILLER V. CALIFORNIA
In Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day,36 decided in 1962, "patent
offensiveness" became an additional requirement. Mr. Justice Harlan
concluded that in order for materials to be considered obscene they
must not only appeal to the "prurient interest" but also must be
"deemed so offensive on their face as to affront current community
standards."3 7 The Court first noted that Roth failed to delineate the
term "contemporary community standards" and then proceeded briefly
to determine the relevant community. It found that because a violation
of a federal statute was involved, a national standard of decency should
govern.38
Two years later, the Court, in Jacobellis v. Ohio, directly con-
fronted the problem of the "contemporary community standard" as
articulated by the Roth Court.39 First, the Court reaffirmed the Roth
standard.40 It then determined that the phrase referred not to the stan-
dards of the particular local community from which the case arose, but
to the standards of the community at large, i.e., a national community
standard.41 Obscenity could have a "varying meaning from time to
36 370 U.S. 478, 482 (1962).
37 Id
38 Id. at 488. The statute in question was 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970).
39 378 U.S. 184 (1964). The concept of "contemporary community standards" was first
enunciated by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119 (S.D.N.Y.
1913).
If there be no abstract definition... should not the word "obscene" be allowed
to indicate the present critical point in the compromise between candor and
shame at which the community may have arrived here and now? If the letters
must . . . be subject to the social sense of what is right, it would seem that a jury
should in each case establish the standard much as they do in cases of negligence.
To put thought in leash to the average conscience of the time is perhaps toler-
able...
209 F. at 121 (emphasis added). The significance of the Kennerley decision lies in its ob-
servation that obscenity may be determined according to a standard, but in so doing, it
is necessary that the framework be flexible. The legal standard to be used by the courts
must be sufficiently flexible to accommodate the evolution in morality and community
mores. H. CLOR, OBscENrrY AND PuBLic MoRALITY 20 (1969). Later decisions employed
Judge Hand's suggestion that when attempting to locate the point between "candor and
shame" obscenity could be flexibly standardized, with its meaning varying from period to
period. See Parmelee v. United States, 113 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1940). Whether this refers
solely to time, scope or encompassed geographical limitations as well has been the
subject of much debate. Although Redd v. State, 7 Ga. App. 575, 67 S.E. 709, 711 (1910),
was decided prior to Kennerley, the Redd court suggested that time, place, and other
surrounding circumstances are factors necessary to the determination of the point of
indecency. Justice Brennan firmly believes that variance from period to period refers only
to time and not geography. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 193 (1964), discussed in notes
41-42 and accompanying text infra.
40378 US. 184, 191 (1964). The Roth standard was recognized as flawed, but any
other test would raise equally difficult problems. Under this standard, material is
branded obscene and denied constitutional protection because it is "utterly without re-
deeming social importance." There is no necessity to weigh the social importance of the
speech as against its prurient interest; if it possesses any degree of social importance it
cannot be deemed obscene.
41Id. at 192-96. The Court reasoned that anything less would be intolerable and
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time," but "not from county to county, or town to town," even though
local communities throughout the country are diverse in nature.4 To
uphold a standard based upon a particular local community would, in
effect, deny materials to some parts of the country which would be
readily obtainable in sections with a more "open" notion of decency.
Suppression in one locality would inhibit dissemination in another and
unconstitutionally restrict public access to printed matter.43
The Court, however, was not yet satisfied with its obscenity stan-
dards. Shortly after Jacobellis, an attempt was made to crystallize the
essences of Roth and subsequent decisions. In A Book Named "John
Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachusetts,44 a tri-
partite guideline was established:
[T]hree elements must coalesce: it must be established that (a) the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a
prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive be-
cause it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the
description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the ma-
terial is utterly without redeeming social value.4 5
To sustain a determination as obscene, each element must be indepen-
dently established. It was stressed by the Court that the third element
is met only if the matter in question is "utterly without redeeming
value. ' 46 If there is some social importance, be it artistic, literary, or
scientific value, no matter how slight, the material should not be con-
demned as obscene.47 Evidence that the material was "utterly without
redeeming value" could be established by a showing that it was "com-
mercially exploited for the sake of prurient appeal" only and any other
value was disregarded in its publication or distribution.48
an affront to rights protected by the Federal Constitution. "It is, after all, a national Con-
stitution we are expounding." Id. at 195.
42Id. at 193-94.
48 Id. Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 US. 478, 488 (1962); Pennekamp v.
Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946) (limits of tolerated free speech will not "vary with state
lines'). See generally Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153 (1959) (city ordinance which
imposed strict criminal liability, by eliminating the element of scienter for the possession
of obscene material, was held unconstitutional as imposing a "severe limitation on the
public's access to constitutionally protected matter").
44 383 US. 413 (1966). This was an appeal from the Massachusetts Superior Court
proceeding which declared the book Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure, commonly known
as Fanny Hill, obscene. But see Larkin v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 14 N.Y.2d 399, 200 N.E.2d
760, 252 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1964).
45 383 US. 413, 418 (1966).
46 Id. at 419 (emphasis in original).
47 Id. at 419 n.7. See Jacobeffis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964). See also People v.
Bruce, 81 IM. 2d 459, 461, 202 N.E.2d 497, 498 (1964) (monologue of comedian); Trans-Lux
Distributing Corp. v. Maryland State Bd. of Censors, 240 Md. 98, 104-05, 213 A.2d 235,
238-39 (1965) (motion picture).
48 383 U.S. 413, 420 (1966). In his concurring opinion, Justice Douglas rejected the
majority's rationale that the social value of the book could be negated if there was proof
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On the same day Memoirs was decided, the Supreme Court, in
Ginzburg v. United States,49 employed the pandering doctrine alluded
to in Memoirs, and branded as obscene publications which it conceded
were inherently not obscene. The commercial exploitation of the ma-
terials, including circumstances of presentation and dissemination with
sole emphasis upon their sexually provocative and erotic aspects, was
found to taint the accused work as "utterly without redeeming value"
within the meaning of the obscenity test.50
In Mishkin v. New York,51 decided at the same time as Memoirs
and Ginzburg, a further refinement and expansion of the obscenity
definition was made. The Court found that the accused material was
designed for and distributed primarily to deviant sexual groups. In
determining whether a work, directed to a deviant group 2 as opposed
to the general public, appeals to the prurient interest, it is the prurient
interest of the former that governs.5 Therefore, the "average person"
concept of Roth did not strictly mean just "normal"' person, but was
meant to include the average person of a sexually deviant group where
the matter in question was directed to that group.
After 1966, and until recently, the Supreme Court had taken a
less active role in refining obscenity guidelines. 4 In Redrup v. New
of pandering. The manner of its advertising should not determine the nature and literary,
scientific, or artistic value of the material. Id. at 427.
Scrutiny of the circumstances of publication or promotion in determining obscenity
is nxot without precedent in the federal courts. In United States v. One Book Called
Ulysses, 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), the district court felt it necessary to determine
whether or not the book in question was written with "pornographic intent." District
Judge Woolsey concluded that although Ulysses was unusually explicit, there was absent
the "leer of the sensualist," and thus, the book was not obscene. Id. at 183. It has been
stated that although there is precedent for the pandering rationale, there was nothing
mentioned in the Roth majority opinion which would make pandering another criterion
for judging obscenity. H. Cr.on, OascE~rrY AND PuBLic MoAL r 80 (1969). But see Roth
v. United States, S54 US. 476, 495 (1957), wherein Mr. Chief Justice Warren, in his
concurring opinioi, stated: "It is not the book that is on trial; it is a person. The conduct
of the defendant is the central issue, not the obscenity of a book or picture."
49 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
5o Id. at 465-66, 470. The purveyor's methods of advertising the erotically arousing
aspects of the work only succeeds in increasing the offensiveness of the work to those al-
ready offended, Id. at 470.
51 283 U.S. 502 (1966).
52 The Court defined a deviant group as one whose members become "sexually stimu-
lated" by viewing deviant sexual practices. Id. at 509. Defendant had contended that
because the books appealed to those interested in deviant sexual practices it automatically
precluded these materials from coming within the "average person-prurient interest"
concept of Roth. Id. at 508.
53Id. at 508-09. The recipient group could not be defined merely as those persons
who were sexually immature. The Court concluded that its determination as to the
material "[being] assessed in terms of the sexual interests of its intended and probable
recipient group" would avoid the pitfalls of vagueness and the restrictiveness of the
Hicklin rule.
54 This is not to say that development came to a complete halt. See, e.g., Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), discussed in note 28 supra. The Court adopted the concept
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York, 55 the Court, in a brief per curiam opinion, abruptly reversed sev-
eral obscenity convictions without mentioning any of its previously
established tests. There were, however, very important post-1966 deci-
sions in the area of obscenity and censorship which did not directly af-
fect the definition of obscenity.56
In the years succeeding the Supreme Court's determinations and
elaborations, lower courts, both federal and state, have labored ardu-
ously to apply them. An incorporated Roth-Memoirs test has generally
been used to judge obscenity.57 Some courts have considered, in addi-
tion to the Roth-Memoirs test, such factors as specific state concern for
the protection of children, pandering, invasion of individual privacy
through unwilling receipt of sexually explicit matter, and assessment
of prurient elements of the sexual interest of intended or probable
recipient groups.5
The lower courts have challenged exact application of Supreme
Court guidelines in two areas. First, courts have questioned the validity
of the "utterly without redeeming social value" test enunciated in
Memoirs as an independent criterion for judging obscenity.5 9 It has
of variable obscenity. When the audience involved is children, less stringent requirements
need be satisfied and obscenity will be more readily found. Therefore, it is possible that
a magazine, though not obscene if the viewing audience is adult, may be found obscene
if its readers are minors. The Court justified its action on its spedal authority, which
does not extend to adults, to control the conduct of children. The Court recognized that
parents have primary responsibility for their children's conduct and the obscenity law
was merely an aid to parents in promoting their children's well-being. Id. at 638-39. Cf.
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968), where the Court struck down an
unconstitutionally vague law seeking to employ the variable obscenity concept. See Note,
Constitutional Problems in Obscenity Legislation -Protecting Children, 54 GEo. L.J. 1379
(1966).
55 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
56 See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969), wherein the Court refused
to allow state regulation of obscenity to extend to and proscribe possession of obscene
matter by an individual in the privacy of his own home. See notes 179-80 and accompany-
ing text infra; cf. United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 355-56 (1971) (F..nstitutional right
to possess obscenity in one's home does not protect defendant's distribution of obscene
materials to willing adult recipients). Stanley was an exception to the Roth-Memoirs
holdings and did not overrule them. See notes 182-86 and accompanying text infra.
57See, e.g., State v. Lavin, - Iowa-, 204 N.W.2d 844 (1973); Commonwealth v.
LaLonde, 477 Pa. 364, 288 A.2d 782 (1972); State v. Grauf, - Ore.-, 501 P.2d 345 (1972);
State v. Watkins, 259 S.C. 185, 191 S.E.2d 135 (1972), vacated in light of Miller, 413 U.S.
905 (1973); Coleman v. Wilson, 123 N.J. Super. 310, 302 A.2d 555 (1973); State ex tel. Dowd
v. "Pay the Baby Sitter," 31 Ohio Misc. 208, 287 N.E.2d 650 (C.P. Stark County 1972).
58 See, e.g., United States v. Pellegrino, 467 F.2d 41 (9th Cir. 1972) (no pandering since
advertising brochure, although presenting explicit illustrations, stated that its purpose
was to provide general information as to sexual functions); United States v. Manarite,
448 F.2d 583 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 947 (1971); State v. Carlson, 294 Minn. 433,
202 N.W.2d 640 (1972), vacated in light of Miller, 94 S. Ct. 263 (1973); Stroud v. State, -
Ind. -, 273 N.E.2d 842, 846-48 (1971), reted in light of Miller, - Ind. -, 300 N.E.2d 100
(1973).
59 See, e.g., NGC Theatre Corp. v. Mummert, 107 Ariz. 484, 489-90, 489 P.2d 823, 829
(1971) (en banc), wherein the court refused to accept social value as a third and separate
element.
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been said that this factor results from something being obscene and
is not an independent component of the obscenity definition.60 Second,
courts have questioned the determination in Jacobellis that the phrase
"contemporary community standards" refers to a national community
and a national standard of decency. Many courts have adopted the
Supreme Court's national standard6' but others have used a different
rule when deemed more appropriate to specific situations. "Local"
standards, be they based on state-wide,62 community-wide,63 or even
school district-wide 64 notions of decency, have been employed as alter-
natives. Rejection of the national standard rationale was based on the
lack of a majority opinion in Jacobellis. The opinion of the Court was
written by only two Justices, both of whom believed in the national
standard.65 It was also reasoned that "community" meant only local
community and not national standards.66
60 State v. Shapiro, 122 N.J. Super. 409, 425, 300 A.2d 595, 604 (1972). "[O]bscenity is
something without redeeming social importance" (emphasis in original).
61See, e.g., Excellent Publications, Inc. v. United States, 309 F.2d 862, 365 (1st Cir.
1962); Visual Educators, Inc. v. Koeppel, 289 Ala. 410, 268 So. 2d 22, 26 (1972); Hermann
v. United States, 304 A.2d 22, 24-25 (D.C. Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Stroud v. State, -Ind. -, 273
N.E.2d 842, 847 (1971), rev'd in light of Miller, - Ind. -, 300 N.E.2d 100 (1973); State v.
Lavin, - Iowa-, -, 204 N.W.2d 844, 848 (1973); Scuncio v. Shipyard Drive-In Theatre,
Inc., - R.I. -, -, 292 A.2d 873, 876 (1972) (even though difficult to define by the court,
a national standard must be applied); State v. Watkins, 259 S.C. 185, 191 S.E.2d 135, 140
(1972), vacated in light of Miller, 413 U.S. 905 (1973); Feldschneider v. State, 127 Ga. App.
745, 195 S.E.d 184, 186" (1972).
62 See, e.g., In re Giannini, 69 Cal. 2d 563, 574-76, 446 P.2d 585, 545-47, 72 Cal. Rptr.
655, 663-65 (1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 910 (1969) (relevant community held to
be State of California where topless dancing is purely of local concern, and a national
standard would be inappropriate); McCauley v. Tropic of Cancer, 20 Wis. 2d 134, 121
N.W.2d 545, 553 (1963); People v. Kaplan, 23 Cal. App. 8d 9, 12, 100 Cal. Rptr. 372, 373
(LA. Super. Ct. App. Dep't 1972), vacated sub nom. Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115
(1973).
63 See, e.g., Hunt v. State, 475 S.W.2d 935, 937 (rex. Crim. App. 1972).
64 See, e.g., Jacobs v. Board of School Comm'rs, 349 F. Supp. 605, 610 (S.D. Ind. 1972).
An injunction was sought to enjoin the suppression by the school board of allegedly
obscene literature. The court held that to be obscene the banned subject matter had to
offend the notions of decency of an entire school district, disapproval by just one school
in the district was held to be insuffident. /
65 See, e.g., People v. Kaplan, 23 Cal. App. 8d 9, 12, 100 Cal. Rptr. 372, 373 (L.A.
Super. Ct. App. Dep't.1972), vacated sub nom. Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115
(1973). In Jacobellis, Justices Brennan and Goldberg delivered the opinion of the Court.
878 US. 184, 187-96 (1964). Justice White concurred without opinion. Id. at 196. Justice
Stewart concurred but emphasized that only hard-core pornography could be limited. Id.
at 197. Justices Black and Douglas concurred in reversing the lower court judgment, but
did so on the ground that any limitation of freedom of speech was repugnant to the
Constitution. Id. at 196-97. Chief Justice Warren and Justice Clark, in their joint dissenting
opinion, agreed that obscenity may be regulated by the government, provided that local
contemporary standards prevail. Id. at 199-203. Justice Harlan dissented, advocating the
separation of federal and state obscenity regulation. State regulation, he said, should
be based upon a rationality test, while federal regulation should be premised upon the
Roth rationale and subsequent amplifications. Id. at 204.
66 Hunt v. State, 475 S.W.2d 935, 937 (rex. Crim. App. 1972).
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Miller v. California -A NEw TEST
In June, 1973, the Supreme Court, in Miller v. California,6" seized
an opportunity to settle the contentious obscenity problem. Rather
than attempt to bury the Roth concepts of obscenity because of all the
surrounding confusion, the Court, on the contrary, has made an effort
to revitalize them.68 Miller follows the basic premise of Roth, that
obscenity may be defined, and once this has been accomplished, it may
be excluded from the umbrella of constitutional protection. 69
Appellant was convicted in the Municipal Court of Orange County
under a California criminal statute prohibiting advertising and mailing
of unsolicited, sexually explicit, obscene material. The statute was
basically a Roth-Memoirs incorporation."0 The materials in question
consisted of five brochures which advertised four books, entitled Inter-
course, Man-Woman, Sex Orgies Illustrated and An Illustrated History
of Pornography, and a film entitled Marital Intercourse. The brochures
contained explicit descriptive words, drawings, and pictures of men
and women engaging in a multitude of sexual activities with a promi-
nent showing of their sexual organs. Recipients of the unsolicited ad-
vertisements complained to the police and the criminal prosecution
ensued. The Superior Court of California, Orange County, affirmed
the conviction, and an appeal to the United States Supreme Court fol-
lowed a denial of rehearing by the state Court of Appeals."1
The Miller Court approached the problem from a historical per-
spective. A review was made of prior obscenity holdings commencing
with Roth as well as a consideration of subsequent amplifications
thereto. The Court noted its failure to achieve majority agreement in
any of the post-Roth decisions."2 It also cited the distinction between
67 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
68 State v. J-R Distributors, Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 584, 512 P.2d 1049, 1060 (1973) (en banc).
69 13 Cim. L. REP. 1083 (Aug. 29, 1973).
70 CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 311 (West Supp. 1973). The state penal code defined
"obscene" as follows:
[r]o the average person, applying contemporary standards, the predominant
appeal of the matter, taken as a whole, is to prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or
morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, which goes substantially beyond cus-
tomary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters and
is matter which is utterly without redeeming social importance.
Following the definition in the Code is a list of specific incidents and descriptions exem-
plifying that which should be considered obscene. Section 311.2 imposes criminal sanctions
for those who knowingly distribute obscene matter.
71 All lower court decisions were unreported.
72 413 U.S. 15, 20-23 (1973). The Court quoted the proposition that obscene utterances
do not constitute the communication of ideas and, therefore, are not constitutionally
protected. See Note, More Ado About Dirty Books, 75 YALE L.J. 1364 (1966), which pro-
vides a score card of how the Court's justices voted on the major cases and the theory
upon which they based their decision.
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the conclusory presumption of Roth that obscenity is "utterly without
redeeming value" and the Memoirs evidentiary requirement that ma-
terial be affirmatively shown to be "utterly without redeeming social
value" before it can be labelled obscene. The Court recognized a need
for an approach alternative to that of Memoirs since the negative bur-
den of proof placed upon the prosecutor thereby made criminal con-
victions almost impossible to secure. 3
As it had been "categorically settled" that obscene materials lack
constitutional protection, the Court acknowledged the "inherent dan-
gers" attending state regulation of expression. 4 It also recognized the
requirement that courts remain sensitive to any encroachment upon all
areas of free speech and the press that are of "serious literary, artistic,
political or scientific value," and therefore deserving of protection.
Accordingly, it found that while states may control such materials
within their own boundaries, such regulation must be limited.75 States
73 413 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1973).
74 Id. at 23. Although the Court found it "categorically settled" that obscene materials
are without the protections of the Constitution, there are some who strongly disagree.
Justice Douglas emphasizes that the Constitution emphatically prohibits governmental
interference in the exercise of free speech or press. The Constitution does not make excep-
tion for obscene utterances, oral or written. The notion that courts, may not implicitly
read such an exception into the Constitution permeates all of Justice Douglas' opinions.
See, e.g., 'Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 40 (1973) (dissenting opinion); Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 70-71 (1973).(dissenting opinion); Byrne v. Karalexis, 396
U.S. 976, 979 (1969) (dissenting opinion); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 426
(1973) (concurring opinion); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 513-14 (1957) (dissenting
opinion).
Justice Black, taking an absolutist position, also posited that all obscenity regulation is
prohibited. Suppression of freedom of expression is censorship, and censorship ends free-
dom and progress. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 160 (1959) (concurring opinion); see
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (dissent-
ing opinion).
Justice Stewart has also taken this line and espoused the evils of censorship. See
Ginzburg v. United States, 383 US. 463, 498 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
76 Limitations by states on expression have always come under close scrutiny by the
courts. Unless justified by immediate exigencies, prior restraints on freedom of expression
have been viewed with much disfavor. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), wherein
the Court refused to enjoin publication of a "potentially" libelous periodical Disfavor of
prior restraint on expression also extends to obscenity. Although freedom of speech is not
an absolute right, it does not follow that states have a blanket license for prior restraint.
Such restraint must "be closely confined so as to preclude what may fairly be deemed
licensing or censorship." Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 US. 436, 441 (1957). In
Kingsley, the Court sustained the validity of a state statute which empowered a state
official to seek an injunction against the sale or distribution of any written or printed
matter indecent in nature. The statute was found to provide sufficient constitutional
safeguards since the seller or distributor had a right to trial within one day of joinder
of issue and a decision within two days after the conclusion of the trial. These speedy
procedures avoided prior censorship of constitutionally protected freedoms. This was not
the case in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 US. 51 (1965). Under the Maryland statute, a
motion picture had to be submitted to state board of censors prior to exhibition. The
procedure, as established, did not provide for prompt judicial determination of the ob-
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can regulate the depiction or description of sexual conduct, but such
prohibitions must be "specifically defined by the applicable state law,
as written" by the legislature or as "authoritatively construed" by the
judiciary.7 6
The Court proceeded to promulgate a three-pronged mandate
which states seeking to regulate obscenity must follow. The state court
must consider:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary commu-
nity standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals
to the prurient interest,
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law,
and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artis-
tic, political, or scientific value.77
Unworkability of the "social importance" and "utterly without redeem-
ing social value" tests was acknowledged, and these were rejected as
constitutional guidelines." The Court felt that the basic framework
outlined above, coupled with provision for independent appellate re-
view, was adequate to protect constitutional rights from state infringe-
ment.79
scenity content of the movie and, thus, amounted to a prior restraint on expression. Id.
at 58-60.
State regulation illegal as a prior restraint on freedom of expression need not be
formal action taken pursuant to statute. In Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58
(1963), practices of an administrative 'commission established by state legislation were
held to be a system of informal censorship and violative of first amendment freedoms.
If a majority of the commission found the materials objectionable the distributor was
notified and asked to cooperate with the commission's decision. This administrative sys-
tem, the Court found, was successful in suppressing publication without the safeguards
of notice or hearing. Id. at 68-72.
76413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). See United Artists Corp. v. Harris, 363 F. Supp. 857, 861
(W.D. Okla. 1973). Where suit was brought in federal district court for injunctive and
declaratory relief against both the seizure of the movie Last Tango in Paris and criminal
prosecution for its exhibition. Oklahoma defined obscenity under a Roth-like standard.
OuA. STAT. ANN. § 1040.12 (Supp. 1973). The district court, in refusing to grant the request
for a preliminary injunction stated that on its face the statute was not in conformity with
Miller and was thus invalid. The case was remanded to the state court to allow the state
to construe the statute in accordance with Miller, and thereby possibly salvage it.
77 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (footnotes omitted). Subsection (a) reflects the reaffirmance
of the Roth concepts. The Court talks in terms of average person, prurient interest, domi-
nant theme, and contemporary community standards. The "patent offensiveness" concept
of Manual Enterprises is reflected in subsection (b). But in subsection (c) the Court at-
tempted a new treatment of the value element, disregarding the Roth and Memoirs ap-
proaches. Cf. People v. Heller, - N.Y.2d -, - N.E.2d -, - N.Y.S.2d - (1973). The New
York Court of Appeals found subsection (c) comparable to the former approaches.
78 413 U.S. 15, 24-25, 25 n.7 (1973). The Court cited the divergence of opinions among
the Justices and the lack of majority approval of any of these concepts.
79 Id. at 25.
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To aid states in formulating statutes sufficiently specific, the Court
suggested types of subject matter which could constitutionally be pro-
hibited. Included were patently offensive depictions of normal or
perverted, actual or simulated, sexual acts and descriptions of masturba-
tion, excretion, or depiction of the sexual organs in a lewd manner.80
This sample specification also provided "fair notice" to commercial
distributors as to what materials shall be proscribed.81
Recognizing its duty of "judicial supervision" to uphold first
amendment rights, the Court next tackled the definitional problem
raised by the phrase '"contemporary community standards." Appellant
had argued that a nation-wide community standard was the only appro-
priate one because freedom of expression is a high priority right which
must be protected from infringement. State regulation, therefore, must
be restricted to that least detrimental to such freedom.8 12 The "national
community standard" of Jacobellis, which appellant urged, was rejected
by the Miller Court in favor of a "local notion of decency." It was
reasoned that a uniform national standard as a single, abstract formula-
tion would hinder a jury in its determinations. It would be an "exercise
in futility" to require a national standard because the country is just
too large and too diverse in its tastes and attitudes.8 3 As additiofial
authority for this proposition, the Court relied upon former Chief
Justice Warren's succinct statement in his dissenting Qpinion in Jacob-
ellis that "there is no provable 'national standard.' "8
The argument that application of a local standard of decency
would prevent the dissemination of materials acceptable to some areas
of the nation merely because such materials transgressed the boundaries
of decency established by others was disposed of by an interesting appli-
cation of reverse reasoning.8s It rationalized that even under a national
standard materials that would have been otherwise acceptable in some
SOld. The Court merely suggested a functional regulatory scheme for the state; it
did not require them to specifically adhere to its suggestions, nor, for that matter, require
them to regulate obscenity at all. See People v. Heller, - N.Y.2d - - N.E.2d
N.Y.S.2d - (1973).
81413 US. 15, 26-28 (1973).
82 Brief for Petitioner at 16-17, Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Appellant's
argument presupposes that a nation-wide standard is more liberal than a local one. As
local standards must vary among communities, this argument is tenuous at best.
83 413 U.S. 15, 30-84 (1978).
It is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First Amendment
as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of
conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York City.
Id. at 32.
84 Id. at 32, quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 878 US. 184, 200 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dis-
senting).
85 In Jacobellis v. Ohio, 878 US. 184, 193-95 (1964), Justices Brennan and Goldberg
based their rejection of the local standard on this theory.
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"open-minded" places still may be banned. The Court then concluded
that a national standard would be equally as dangerous to the freedom
of expression as a standard based upon local attitudes.8 6
Appellant's contention that application of a local standard would
necessarily place "unconscionable burdens on the free flow of interstate
commerce" was similarly dismissed. State regulation of obscene material
has long been recognized as a valid exercise of police power despite its
incidental effects on interstate commerce.8 7
The Court next replied to the fears and charges of repression by
the dissenting Justices. Borrowing from Roth, the Court rejected Jus-
tice Brennan's challenge that Miller is just the beginning of "state-
ordered regimentation of our minds."'8  Hardcore pornography ex-
ploited for commercial gain, said the Court, may be strictly censored,
with first amendment protections afforded to those works which do
have "serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value," thus protect-
ing the free exchange of thoughts. To Justice Brennan's anticipation of
repression, Chief Justice Burger answered that the courts are competent
to distinguish the constitutionally protected exchange of ideas from the
commercial exploitation of hard-core pornography. 9
Summarily, the Supreme Court established its guidelines. It re-
served to the state courts, based upon local concepts of decency, the
power of obscenity regulation and the power to test the constitutional-
ity of their state's statutes. 90
86413 U.S. 15, 32 n.13 (1973). See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 505-06 (1957)
(Harlan, J.). Justice Harlan believed that the Federal Government's interest in regulation
of obscenity, like its interest in the regulation of libel, is only of an incidental nature, the
primary responsibility resting with the states. This is the better situation as state legisla-
tures are less threatening to first amendment rights due to their capacity to adopt new
modes of "social control" to meet their individual needs. "The prerogative of the States
to differ on their ideas of morality will be destroyed, the ability of the States to experi-
ment will be stunted [if a national standard is adopted]." Id. at 506.
87413 U.S. 15, 32 n.13 (1973). Additionally, the Miller Court noted that in this par-
ticular case there was no showing that the accused materials were ever distributed across
state boundaries.
In Kidd v. Pearson, 128 US. 1 (1888), the Court noted that state regulation is not
unlimited. The incidental effects of such regulation of interstate commerce must be scruti-
nized because the state cannot unjustly infringe upon such commerce. Id. at 23. See also
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond,
336 U.S. 525 (1949); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
88 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 110 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
89 413 U.S. 15, 34-36 (1973). See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482-85 (1957).
90 People v. Enskat, 33 Cal. App. 3d 900, 109 CaL Rptr. 433 (1973). Following this policy,
the Supreme Court remanded Miller and several other pending obscenity cases to state and
lower federal courts for further proceedings consistent with the new obscenity definition.
See Miller v. United States, 413 U.S. 913 1973) (mem.), vacating 431 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1970);
Ewing v. United States, 413 U.S. 913 (1973) (mem.), vacating 445 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1971);
Kaplan v. United States, 413 U.S. 913 (1973) (mem.), vacating 277 A.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1971);




In the wake of this landmark decision has grown a plethora of
commentary, both legal and social. Some commentators have applauded
the decision as a method of stemming the flood of pornography which
has saturated the American cultural market. Others have viewed the
decision with much disdain. Their disapproval is primarily based upon
fear and resentment of any threat of repression of ideas and thoughts.
Some will concede the necessity for a curb on the sexual permissiveness
of society but such stern control as this, they believe, threatens its entire
cultural, intellectual, and educational development.
The full impact of Miller on obscenity law has yet to be realized.
Judicial application of the Miller guidelines is now taking place. Early
indications tend to dissipate all hope that the Supreme Court has finally
established "concrete guidelines." What has so far occurred and what
appears to be continuing in the state and lower federal courts is much
litigation with varying results more often than not characterized by
confusion as to what is obscene and what is the determining standard.9 1
The Miller guidelines require that the types of descriptions and
representations of sexual conduct to be proscribed be specifically
delineated in the applicable statute. The required specificity may be
accomplished through judicial construction or by the language of the
legislative enactment itself.92 In response to this requisite element,
lower state and federal courts have begun, at their earliest opportunity,
a close examination of their jurisdiction's obscenity and decency stat-
utes. Interesting interpretations of the Miller specifications, with often
contrasting and conflicting decisions as to the validity of obscenity
statutes, even though their language be identical, have been the result
of these individual inquiries.
A survey of obscenity statutes from the many jurisdictions reveals a
great variance in their scope. A small number are extremely detailed,9 3
more are quite general in their language94 but most are in-between.
(1971); Art Theater Guild, Inc. v. Tennessee ex rel. Rhodes, 415 U.S. 904 (1973) (mem.).
vacating 225 Tenn. 399, 469 S.W.2d 669 (1971).
91 See notes 104-10, 142-48 and accompanying text infra.
92 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
93 See, e.g., Ap.iz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-537(C)(1) (Supp. 1972), discussed in notes 97-98
and accompanying text infra.
94 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 14W (1970), discussed in notes 100-01 and accompanying text
infra; IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-2803(a) (Supp.1973), discussed in notes 105, 108, and accompany-
ing text infra; AfAss. GEN. Ln-Ws ANN. ch. 272, § 28A (1970), discussed in notes 103, 107 and
accompanying text infra; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.280 (Supp. 1972); WAsH. REv. CoDn ANN.
§ 9.68.010(1) (1961), discussed in notes 104-06 and accompanying text infra.
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The middle group primarily consists of statutes which embody either
a sole Roth standard,95 or an incorporated Roth-Memoirs test.98
In the case of the very detailed statutes, the requisite specificity
has been easily recognized. Arizona imposes criminal sanctions for the
exhibition of "explicit sexual material" defined as the depiction of
"human sexual intercourse, masturbation, bestiality, oral intercourse,
[or] anal intercourse." 97 In a suit which challenged the decency of the
movie The Last Picture Show, the federal district court found that
Arizona's statute closely resembled the examples of obscenity articulated
by the Miller Court.98
The validity of a broad, general statute presents courts with a more
difficult determination. This type of statute usually provides no defini-
tion other than the word obscene itself, or the use of synonyms such as
lewd, filthy, lascivious, impure, or indecent.99
In the federal arena, the Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Thevis,
upheld the validity of section 1462, title 18, United States Code, which
prohibits obscenity from flowing in interstate commerce 00 The court
took the position that the prohibited depictions of sexual conduct could
be, under Miller, authoritatively construed by the judiciary. Relying
on the action of the Supreme Court in United States i,. 12 200-Ft. Reels
of Super 8mm Film,101 a case decided at the same time as Miller, the
95 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.011(10) (1965), as amended, § 847.011(11) (Supp. 1972),
discussed in notes 110, 112 and accompanying text infra; NJ. R.v. STAT. ANN. 2A:115-1.1
(Supp. 1973), discussed in notes 111, 113-14 and accompanying text infra.9 6 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 311 (West Supp. 1973), discussed in notes 117-20
and accompanying text infra; GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2101 (1972); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 285 (Mc-
Kinney 1967), discussed in note 109 infra; TENN. CoDE ANN. § 39-8007 (Supp. 1972); TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. Art. 527 § I(A) (Supp. 1972), discussed in note 116 and accompanying text
infra.
97ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-587(A) & (C)(1) (Supp. 1978).
98 BBS Productions, Inc. v. Purcell, 13 Cium. L REP. 2888 (D.C. Ariz. Aug. 1, 1973).
Miller gives as examples these patently offensive depictions: "ultimate sexual acts," "mastur-
bation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals." 418 U.S. 15, 25 (1978).
While the BBS court seized the opportunity to construe the state obscenity statute, other
federal courts have deferred decision until a state, either by judicial construction or statute,
decides if its statute comports with Miller. See, e.g., Detco, Inc. v. McCann, 14 Camr. L. rEP.
2145 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 21, 1978), wherein the court abstained from deciding the constitu-
tionality of Wis. STAT. ANN. § 944.21 (1958); United Artists Corp. v. Harris, 368 F. Supp.
857 (W.D. Okla. 1978), discussed in note 76 supra.
99 See note 94 supra.
100 14 Cams. L. RE'. 2026 (5th Cir. Oct. 10, 1978). 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (1970) prohibits any
"obscene, lewd, lascivious or filthy book, pamphlet," or the like.
101 418 U.S. 123, 180 n.7 (1978). Here, 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1970), which prohibits the
importation and provides for the seizure of articles which are "obscene and immoral," was
attacked as unconstitutional on its face because of its Pneral terms. In sustaining the
validity of the section Chief Justice Burger noted that if vagueness and questionable validity
were created by the use of the words "obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy," the Court
would interpret these terms as proscribing only hardcore, patently offensive depictions of
sexual conduct as described in Miller. See United States v. 87 Photographs, 402 U.S. 863,
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court applied judicial gloss to turn a general prohibition statute into
the more specific type demanded by Miller. Although the statute ap-
peared to encompass a broad scope of regulation, its sweep was judicially
narrowed to prohibition of patently offensive hard-core pornography. 02
On the state level, Massachusetts 10 3 and Washington 0 4 affirmed the
validity of their general obscenity statutes, while Indiana0 5 rejected its
own as unconstitutionally vague. The Washington court recognized
that, by itself, "obscene" without further clarification in the statute was
unconstitutionally vague, and that obscenity should not be described
in terms of itself. The court then proceeded to limit the statute in light
of the Miller dictates, and their application by the Supreme Court in
12 200-Ft. Reels, so as to regulate only those works which are patently
offensive or contain descriptions of hard-core sexual conduct. 016 The
Massachusetts appellate court also concluded that the statute need not
specifically set out an obscenity standard in order to be constitutional
but could be limited by the process of judicial construction, and
thereby retain its vitality.10 7
Indiana, whose statute was worded similarly to its Washington and
Massachusetts counterparts, reached a different result. In light of Miller,
the Indiana court ruled that the Indiana statute was too general and
failed to set out specifically the sexual acts which, when depicted, would
constitute a violation. 08 Unlike Washington and Massachusetts, In-
diana did not take the judicial construction route to validate an other-
wise general and vague statute. The choice made by the Indiana court,
although different from other states' decisions, is permissible and con-
369-71 (1971), wherein Justice White discusses an attempt by the courts to judicially construe
a statute so as to uphold its constitutionality and affirm its vitality.
102 14 CRAm. L. REP. 2026 (5th Cir. Oct. 10, 1973).
103 Commonwealth v. Claflin, - Mass. App. -, 298 N.E.2d 888 (1973). MAss. Gm'a.
Lws ANN. ch. 272, § 28A (1970), which prohibits the distribution or sale of "obscene,
indecent, or impure" materials was attacked as unconstitutionally vague.
104 State v. J-R Distributors, Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 584, 512 P.2d 1049 (1973) (en banc).
The validity of WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.68.010(1) (J961), which prohibits the exhibition,
sale or distribution of obscene articles, was challenged as overly broad.
105 Mohney v. State, - Ind. -, 300 N.E.2d 67 (1973); Stroud v. State, - Ind. -, 300
N.E.2d 100 (1973), 4ev'g - Ind. -, 273 N.E.2d 842 (1971). The validity of IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 10-2803(a) (Supp. 1973), which imposed criminal liability for sending into the state any
"obscene, lewd, indecent or lascivious literature, book, [or] magazine," was questioned.
106 State v. J-R Distributors, Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 584, 512 P.2d 1049, 1059-61 (1973) (en
banc).
107Commonwealth v. Claflin,- Mass. App -, 298 N.E.2d 888, 889 (1973). See State
ex rel. Wampler v. Bird, - Mo. -, 499 S.W.2d 780 (1973), wherein the Supreme Court
of Missouri upheld its general obscenity statute, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.280 (Supp. 1972).
108 Mohney v. State, - Ind. -, 300 N.E.2d 67 (1973); Stroud v. State, - Ind. -, 300
N.E.2d 100 (1973), rev'g - Ind. -, 273 N.E.2d 842 (1971).
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sonant with the Supreme Court's policy to let individual localities make
their own determinations concerning obscenity.
While there may be no serious difficulty when individual states
make conflicting decisions as to the validity of similar statutes, a prob-
lem does arise when two lower courts of the same state make contradic-
tory determinations as to the validity of a single state-wide statute. For
several months New York was caught in this paradox. There, two ir-
reconcilable decisions as to the validity of a single obscenity statute
emanated from different divisions of the same court.109
Court interpretations of the third type of statute, those of the in-
between group, have also resulted in conflicting decisions. Under their
109 In New York, under section 6330 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR), a
county district attorney or prosecutor may seek an injunction to halt the distribution o
display of any "obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent or disgusting" written matter,
photograph, motion picture or any other type of material which could be categorized under
section 235 of the Penal Law as obscene. The state Penal Law defines "obscene" in terms
of the Roth-Memoirs coalescence standard. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 235.00 (McKinney 1967).
Two months after Miller, the New York County Supreme Court, in Redlich v. Capri
Cinema, Inc., 347 N.Y.S.2d 811 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1973), refused to issue an in-
junction under CPLR § 6330 because it found this statute to be unconstitutionally over-
broad. There was no limitation built into the statute which would limit its regulatory
force to those works lacking serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. As written,
it could encompass works which, although dealing with sex, also legitimately possessed
the requisite serious value. The statute, Justice Gellinoff found, lacked any built-in limita-
tion and none could be judicially construed from its language. The court also indicated
that section 235 of the Penal Law possibly exceeded the permissible scope of regulation,
as it failed to confine itself to specifically described sexual conduct, nor could any such
limitation be construed. 347 N.YS.2d at 816-17. This decision brought a temporary halt
in New York County to further attempts by the district attorney and police to enjoin such
exhibitions and displays.
Soon after Redlich, the Nassau County Supreme Court refused to dismiss a request
for an injunction to stop the showing of the movie Last Tango in Paris under CPLR
§ 6330, notwithstanding defendant's allegations that the underlying penal provision was
vague and overbroad. In Lynbrook v. United Artists Corp., 347 N.Y.S.2d 856 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1973), the presumption of constitutionality of section 6330 was held not
overcome. The court also noted that the predecessor to section 6330, N.Y. CODE Camra. PRo.
§ 22-a (McKinney 1970), had been upheld by the United States Supreme Court. See Kingsley
Books v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957); Milkyway Productions, Inc. v. Leary, 305 F. Supp.
288 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd sub nom. New York Feed Co. v. Leary, 397 U.S. 98 (1970) (per
curiam) (affirming the validity of N.Y. PENAL I w § 235.00 (McKinney 1967)). Although
"obscene" was not defined in section 6330, the court judicially construed it to encompass
the Miller requirements. 347 N.Y.S.2d at 860.
The court's reliance upon previous Supreme Court decisions validating the New York
statutes is questionable as they were based on a Roth-Memoirs standard of obscenity. The
decision as to definiteness through the vehicle of judicial construction actually was, under
the Miller guideline, within the prerogative of the court.
On appeal, the Appellate Division, First Department, tentatively settled the conflict by
reversing Redlich. Redlich v. Capri Cinema, 43 App. Div. 2d 27, 349 N.Y.S.2d 697 (Ist Dep't
1973). The court, following the Miller suggestion of judicial construction, found the civil
statute well within the guideline. Any other determination, it was rationalized, would
frustrate the clear legislative intent to control obscenity. Id. at 30, 349 N.Y.S.2d at 701. As
in Lynbrook, the court relied on pre-Miller United States Supreme Court decisions up-
holding the constitutionality of the New York statutes. Id. at 30, 349 N.YS.2d at 701. The
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respective criminal codes, Florida 10 and New Jersey'" define obscenity
by the Roth standard. After examining their statutes for definiteness,
Florida found its own valid, while a federal district court voided the
New Jersey statute for vagueness. Florida relied on judicially imposed
limitations to save its acknowledgedly broad statute.112 After examining
the legislative history of the New Jersey statute, a three-judge federal
court found it purposefully broad in nature and not embodying the
Miller concepts. It was the legislative intent that the Roth test be the
only standard in the prosecution of obscenity offenses.113 As the statute
did not include a "patently offensive" test, nor specifically define the
sexual descriptions which would be prohibited, it would unconstitu-
tionally proscribe material that possessed the requisite serious value
and did not depict sexual conduct in a patently offensive manner."14
Again, two states employ the same statutory language, but the courts
reach different results as to their respective statutes' validity. This para-
dox is attributable to the Supreme Court's new policy of local deter-
mination.
Other states have readily concluded that their statutes incorporat-
court found that the movies in question were hard-core pornography and were exploited
for their sexual aspects and perversions only. Instead of discussing the relevant New York
community standards, the court found that the movies would violate the community
standards of Sodom and Gomorrah, and, thus, a fortiori, would violate any conceivable
New York community standard. Id. at 28, 349 N.Y.S.2d at 699. It is open to serious ques-
tion whether the standards of a narrowly circumscribed New York community, e.g., Times
Square, would proscribe whatever would violate the standards of Sodom and Gomorrah.
In any event, this approach plainly violates the "local community" concept of Miller.
The New York Court of Appeals has since sustained the validity of N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 235 (McKinney 1967). In People v. Heller, - N.Y.2d -, - N.E.2d -, - N.Y.S.2d -
(1978), the court found the statute to proscribe only hard-core pornography.
110 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.011(10) (1965), as amended, § 847.011(11) (Supp. 1972); "ITMhe
test of whether or not material is obscene is: Whether to the average person, applying con-
temporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to prurient interest."
111N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:115-1.1 (Supp. 1973).
112 Rhodes v. State, 283 So. 2d 351, 356-58 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1973); Papp v. State, 281 So. 2d
600 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973). In State ex rel. Sensenbrenner v. Adult Book Store, 35 Ohio
St. 2d 220, 301 N.E.2d 695 (1973), the Supreme Court of Ohio, in a per curiam opinion,
upheld the validity of the Ohio obscenity statute, Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2905.34 (1971).
This statute is unique in that it defines obscenity in several ways. First, material may be
obscene under the Roth test. The Roth quality comes through although the contemporary
community standard element is lacking. Second, material may be obscene if it arouses lust
because of its sexual depictions of nudity, bestiality, bizarre violence or the like. Or, in
the alternative, if the depictions of this bizarre sexual conduct are included for the sake
of commercial exploitation rather than any valuable scientific, artistic, or moral purpose,
then they may also be found obscene. Although the court did not substantiate its reason-
ing, it appears that the statute was read conjunctively and not as an enumeration of
separate and independent tests, each alone sufficient to satisfy the requisite definiteness.
113 Hamar Theatres, Inc. v. Cryan, 365 F. Supp. 1312, 1323-26 (D.N.J. 1973); see
Roth v. New Jersey, 14 Curi. L. REP. 4051 (U.S. Oct. 24, 1973); N.J. REv. STAT. ANN. 2A:
115-l.la (Supp. 1973) (which recognizes the unworkability of the Roth-Memoirs test).
114 365 F. Supp. 1312, 1328-29 (D.N.J. 1973).
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ing the Roth-Memoirs definition meet the Miller dictates.115 Even
though Miller deleted the Memoirs element of "utterly without
redeeming social value," its presence in the Texas"16 and California 117
statutes did not affect their validity.
California, in People v. Enskat,"8 held that the intent of Miller
was to strengthen the prohibition against obscenity, and that to declare
its own statute unconstitutional would violate this mandate." 9 Inas-
much as the Supreme Court did not expressly declare the Memoirs
"utterly" element unconstitutional, but simply deleted it, the Enskat
court, in keeping with the tenor of Miller, simply ignored that element
in the California statute until legislative changes could be made. It
found the statute sufficiently definitive in that it forbids only hard-core
pornography, and therefore sustained its validity.20
Judicial construction is one means of achieving the specificity req-
uisite to a valid obscenity statute. The Miller Court also suggested a
more direct approach, viz., legislative enactment. Several state legisla-
tures have recently appointed special committees which have began
hearings and proceedings to aid in the formulation of new laws con-
sonant with the standard of Miller.'2' Such legislation incorporating the
tri-partite Miller test has already been proposed in the General Assem-
blies of Illinois,12 Pennsylvania, 23 and Kansas. 124
115 See, e.g., Grigsby v. State, 14 CiuM. L. REP. 2134 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 1973).
which upheld TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-3003 & 8007 (Supp. 1973); Redlich v. Capri Cinema,
43 App. Div. 2d 27, 349 N.Y.S.2d 697 (Ist Dep't 1973).
116 Richards v. State, 497 S.W.2d 770, 777 n.11 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), upholding TEx.
PENAL CODE ANN. art. 527, § I(A) (Supp. 1972). There the court found that the "social
value" element placed an additional burden on the prosecutor.
317 People v. Enskat, 33 Cal. App. 3d 900, 109 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1973), upholding the
validity of CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 311 (West Supp. 1973).
118 33 Cal. App. 3d 900, 109 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1973).
119 The court acknowledged that the test of "merely lacks serious value" as opposed to
"is utterly without redeeming social value" relaxes the burden of the prosecutor and makes
it much easier for the people to succeed. See Miller v. California, 413 US. 15, 22 (1973).
The "utterly" element places upon the prosecutor the burden of proving a negative which
is almost impossible. 33 Cal. App. 3d 900, 910-11, 109 Cal. Rptr. 433, 440-41 (1973).
120 33 Cal. App. 3d 900, 908-12, 109 Cal. Rptr. 433, 438-41 (1973).
121 See, e.g., S.C. H.R. Con. Res. 1128 (Sept. 20, 1973) which established a nine-man
committee to study pornography and obscenity laws. The purpose of these hearings was
to obtain information from the public, elected governmental officials, and other interested
parties in order to determine if alterations to the existing statutes were necessary. Arizona
Public Hearing on Pornography, Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on Pornography
Investigation, Sept. 24, 1973.
122 House Bill 2005, introduced June 28, 1973.
123 Senate Bill 1236 which, as of October 22, 1973, was still in the Judiciary Committee
of the General Assembly.
124 Proposed amendments to the Kansas obscenity statutes follow the basic Miller test
with some mild variations. As to the value requirements, a fifth one is added, viz., educa-
tional. The proposed value element also deletes "serious" as a value requirement. The
committee report accompanying this proposed bill explained that the lessening of the
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Vagueness
The states, either by judicial construction or legislation, are at-
tempting to emulate the teachings of Miller and embody within their
law a specific standard. This has been the subject of severe criticism in
that the Miller pronouncements are themselves not sufficiently definite.
Charges of vagueness have resulted in their condemnation by several of
the dissenting Justices as just another set of unworkable guidelines.a25
For a statute to be sustained, the Constitution mandates that it
"provide adequate notice to persons who are engaged in the type of
conduct that the statute" seeks to prohibit. Failure to give adequate
notice is especially distasteful in the area of free speech.126
The Miller solution to the obscenity problem is tenuous because,
in its attempt to define a perhaps undefinable concept, the Court em-
ploys subjective criteria such as " 'prurient interest,' 'patent offensive-
ness,' 'serious literary value,' and the like."' 27 The problem inherent
requirement for acceptability is permissible because this standard does not exceed the maxi-
mum bounds of regulation permitted by Miller in accomplishing the desired effect of de-
creasing the prosecutor's burden. Committee Report of the Special Committee on Criminal
Law and Related Matters on Proposal No. 87 at 15. The amendment also avoids specific
references to nudity, excretion, sadism, or masochism, in favor of the phrase "ultimate
sexual acts." The committee decided that the latter would satisfy the requirement of
specificity in the depiction of sexual conduct, while the. other terms would not. Id. at 16.
125 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 41-42 (1973) (Douglas and Brennan, J.J., dissent-
ing); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 83-89 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The
majority of the Miller Court believed the standard to be definitive and held that if a state
incorporated within its statutes specific depictions of what is to be proscribed adequate
and fair notice would be given to those who, because of their dealings in such materials,
would be subject to criminal prosecutions. 413 US. 15, 27-28 (1973).
128 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 87-88 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that
fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated
conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle is that no man shall
be criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand
to be proscribed.
Id. at 87, quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954). See Interstate Circuit,
Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968); cf. Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 350-54 (1964). In
Bauie, a criminal trespass statute was on its face precise. Retroactive judicial construction
broadened the law so as to bring the defendants within its prohibitions. This situation,
the Supreme Court felt, was even more damaging than when a statute is vague or over-
broad on its face. At least the latter type of statute suggests to the future defendant that
his contemplated conduct may come within its ill-defined prohibitions. The retroactively
broadened statute gives no warning at all. Id. See also Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doc-
trine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960).
127 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 84 (1973). Justice Stewart has conceded
that obscenity cannot be defined, but that he "know[s] it when he see[s] it." Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 US. 184, 197 (1964) (concurring opinion). This viewpoint was adopted by the
Court when it eliminated the requirement that a prosecutor produce expert testimony
when obscene material was placed in evidence. The Court concluded that its content speaks
for itself. Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973). The Second Circuit, employing the
"I know it when I see it" rationale, found the film Sinderella obscene. United States v.
One Reel of 35mm Color Motion Picture Film Entitled "Sinderella," Sherpix, Inc., - F.2d
- (2d Cir. 1974). See People v. Heller, - N.Y.2d -, - N.E.2d -, N.Y.S.2d - (1973).
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under the Roth-Memoirs criteria with regard to who is the "average"
citizen reappears. The problem is further aggravated when meanings
are attributed by police, prosecutors, and the courts to these indefinite
concepts on the basis of personal life experiences, philosophies, and
idiosyncracies. 128 What is especially feared by some, when standards
vary according to each person's own predispositions, is the creation of
an open invitation to erratic and arbitrary exercise of police power. 120
It is feared that every writer and dealer of literature, motion pictures,
or any type of media will be subjected to local police interpretations of
these indefinite subjective concepts.130
When high priority rights are affected, e.g., freedom of expression,
laws based upon subjectivity and community considerations are es-
pecially undesirable. But this is not to say that all laws based upon
these considerations are invalid. For even where constitutional rights
are involved, e.g., protection of land from government confiscation,131
the law recognizes that subjectivity, aesthetics, and community objec-
tives are valid considerations when formulating new law. Zoning ordi-
nances have been upheld even though their restrictions were based
128 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 84 (1973).
129 The Miller guidelines as framed give carte-blanche to the "predilections of local
authorities . . . [and tend] only [to] exacerbate the problem of vagueness." Trinkler v.
Alabama, 94 S. Ct. 26 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49, 88 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). When the standard imposed is so vague that
the "censor is set adrift upon a boundless sea," Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S.
676, 684 (1968), quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 504 (1952), "those
who are to apply it are left with too much discretion." Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas,
390 U.S. 367, 684, citing Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 694 (1959)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
130 Trinkler v. Alabama, 94 S. Ct. 265 (1973). This apprehension appears to be well
founded. In New York, the Albany County district attorney not only subpoenaed all "X-
rated" movies that were appearing in the county movie theaters for grand jury review, but
requested that all theater operators remove, at least temporarily, any "X-rated" movies
from their programs. The mayor of Albany issued orders to the police department that
it was to monitor city movie theaters and, in its discretion, remove those materials of
questionable acceptability. 170 N.Y.LJ. 22, Aug. 1, 1973, at I, cols. 5-6.
Hauntingly reminiscent of the fifteenth century counter-reformation burnings and the
Salem witchhunts were recent events in Drake, North Dakota. The local school board
ordered the burning of Kurt Vonnegut's novel, Slaughterhouse Five, James Dickey's De-
liverance, and several anthologies of Faulkner, Hemingway, and Steinbeck. The books were
deemed unsuitable for classroom study because of their references to sexual conduct and
profanity, and were symbolically disposed of. N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1973, at 27, col. 1.
How "dirty" does a "dirty" word have to be before it is censored? In Cohen v. Cali-
fornia, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), the Supreme Court rejected the state's attempt to impose crim-
inal sanctions upon the defendant because he openly wore his jacket which bore the words
"Fuck the Draft." The crudeness and distasteful method of expression was noted by the
Court, but first amendment considerations of free dialogue outweighed its offensiveness
Id. at 21. The State could not as "guardians of [the] public morality" remove this offensive
utterance from the vocabulary of its citizens. Id. at 23-26. "[IThe State has no right to
cleanse public debate to the point where it is grammatically palatable to the most squeam-
ish among us." Id. at 25.
131 U.S. CoNST. amends. V, XIV.
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primarily or even exclusively upon aesthetics-subjectivity. 1 2 Why it
should be permissible to have zoning laws based upon these considera-
tions and impermissible to base obscenity regulation on the subjective
considerations of a community may best be explained by the fact that
the former restriction is of truly local nature. Zoning regulation affects
real property permanently affixed within the community; it affects only
the community. Obscenity regulation affects personal property and
even under the guise of community control has nationwide implica-
tions. A decision labelling a literary work obscene in one locality with
perhaps criminal penalties imposed upon the distributor may deter
him from disseminating the work anywhere in the nation for fear of
further prosecution.
The Supreme Court intended the Miller formula to be concrete. 133
The vagueness and uncertainty of its final formulation, however, results
not only in confusion, but in infringement upon several important values
as well. First, by failing to give adequate notice, obscenity laws threaten
to trap the unsuspecting and innocent. Second, first amendment freedoms
are placed in jeopardy. It is a matter of great concern when this chilling
effect pervades the area of freedom of expression.134 Third, the vague
law leaves its enforcement to the subjective discretion of police or local
courts. Open discretion invites arbitrary, erratic, and discriminatory
application. 33 Finally, and partially as a result of the invitation to dis-
cretion, such vagueness inevitably results in "institutional stress."
Courts will be overrun with marginal cases of borderline obscenity.
With each case a court will have to decide whether or not to grant first
amendment protection. This ad hoc approach will clog the judicial
machinery by transforming every case into a constitutional question. 3 6
Whether or not this vagueness defect can be corrected is as yet an
unanswered question. Justice Stewart has implied that obscenity is
inherently vague and will thus always remain an indefinable concept.137
132 Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967). The
Court of Appeals recognized that although aesthetic objectives alone may support a zoning
ordinance, these objectives may not be manipulated by the state to enforce unreasonable
and discriminatory decisions. As a safeguard, the aesthetic considerations must relate to
the community's economic, social, and cultural policies. Cf. Sun Oil Co. v. Madison Heights,
41 Mich. App. 47, 199 N.V.2d 525 (1972) (aesthetics can be an incidental consideration
when enacting zoning laws).
133 413 U.S. 15, 29 (1973).
134 When statutory vagueness potentially inhibits speech, courts generally will scruti-
nize the statute more closely and apply a stricter standard as to the limit of permissible
vagueness. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 88 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959).
135 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 87-88 (1973).
130 Id. at 91.
137Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 US. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). The Court,
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Ex Post Facto Application
Closely related to the requirement of fair notice is the due process
consideration of ex post facto application of laws. When Miller dis-
tributed his brochures neither he nor his prosecutor could have an-
ticipated with any degree of certainty that they would be found obscene
under a yet unarticulated, but stricter standard.188 Miller was placed
in the same position as Ralph Ginzburg.139 Both had their convictions
affirmed under law set forth by the Court subsequent to their alleged
criminal acts.
To prevent further impingement upon due process guarantees,
lower courts have attempted to limit, time-wise, the Miller yardstick of
obscenity. Some say they will apply Miller prospectively, i.e., to offenses
committed after the decision.. 40 It has also been suggested that in a
case in the trial or appeal stage when Miller was announced, the ac-
cused must receive the benefit of both the Miller and Roth-Memoirs
tests. For a conviction, therefore, the material in question must be ad-
judged obscene under both tests.1 4 1
How Large Is the Relevant Community?
In response to the vagueness problem, lower courts are now at-
tempting to attach specific meaning to the words employed by the
Court in its "concrete guideline." The majority claimed in Miller that
it had finally settled the problem of what are proper community stan-
dards. But whether or not they have finally settled the question of
optimal community size remains to be seen. True, the Court explicitly
stated that the Jacobellis nation-wide standards are not to be used. It
failed, however, to articulate exactly what was to be used in their
place. It was stated that in an obscenity prosecution it would be un-
when confronted with the problem of obscenity, is "faced with the task of trying to define
what may be the indefineable." See People v. Heller, - N.Y.2d - - N.E.2d -, - N.Y.S.
2d - (1973) (Wachtler, J., dissenting).1 38 413 U.S. at 38 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see Trinkler v. Alabama, 94 S. Ct. 265 (1973)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (on remand, the state court will employ in its determination stan-
dards which no one knew existed at the time the alleged offense was committed); Jenkins
v. State, 230 Ga. 726, 199 S.E.2d 183, 186-87 (Gunter, J., dissenting), prob. juris. noted, 94
S. Ct. 719 (1973).
189 See Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966) (pandering rationale introduced).
Justice Black, in his dissenting opinion, expressed outrage at this decision. Id. at 476.
140 See, e.g., Rhodes v. State, 283 So. 2d 351, 354-55 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1973). The court
found that the statute, on its face, sufficiently comported with the first two elements of
the Miller test, but found the new literary value test not embodied within the statute
absent additive judicial construction. As the offense was committed prior to the Supreme
Court ruling, the state court refrained from applying a new construction of the statute in
order to protect defendant's due process rights. Id.; Papp v. State, 281 So. 2d 600 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1973); see also United States v. Lang, 361 F. Supp. 380 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
141 United States v. Thevis, 484 F.2d 1149, 1154-55 (5th Cir. 1973).
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workable to have a jury apply an "abstract formulation" based upon
uniform national standards since in any prosecution jurors are in-
structed to draw their conclusions based upon their own community
standards. After intimating that community standards were based upon
local notions of decency, the Miller Court proceeded to adopt the
California approach which applies state-wide community standards. 142
Thus, it is now established that proper standards shall be gauged in a
"local sense," but within the confines of state-wide standards. This is
one of the concrete guidelines with which the Miller Court has left us.
Through Miller, the Supreme Court intended to return to the
individual states plenary power to determine questions on obscenity
with the aim that they would mold their answers according to their
unit needs. Reflecting the lack of clarity of the Supreme Court's rejec-
tion of nation-wide community standards, lower courts have come up
with a variety of substitute boundaries. Alabama and Texas seem to
take the county approach. 143 The Supreme Court of Washington indi-
342 413 U.S. 15, 31-43 (1973).
Prior to Miller, the movie Deep Throat, which was described as the "nadir of deca-
dence," was found obscene by a New York City Criminal Court sitting without a jury.
People v. Mature Enterprises, Inc., 73 Misc. 2d 744, 764, 343 N.Y.S.2d 911, 925 (N.Y.C. Crim.
CL N.Y. County 1973). On the other hand, a jury sitting in the Binghamton, New York,
City Court found the movie not obscene. People v. Binghampton Theatres, Inc., cited in
People v. Mature Enterprises, Inc., id. at 763, 343 N.Y.S.2d at 924. These opposite deter-
minations are interesting in that they tend to refute the Court's reference to forcing the
people of smaller, less open-minded areas to accept what is deemed acceptable in the
more open-minded places when substantiating its local community rationale. Ser note 83
and accompanying text supra.
The thrust of Miller's local community standards was that obscenity determinations
should be reflective of community mores. These community notions of decency are deter-
mined by the jury. It is ironic that the Binghamton jury, composed of members of the -
community, found the movie not obscene while the judge in New York City found it
obscene. The judge in Mature Enterprises attempted to circumvent the Binghamton jury's
determination by suggesting that failure to convict was based on their confusion over the
state's obscenity laws. 73 Misc. 2d at 763, n.13, 343 N.Y.S.2d at 924, n.13. Thus, the court
rationalized away the fact that a small city jury refused to condemn as obscene a movie
characterized by it as the "nadir of decadence."
143 The Texas approach is based upon the geographical area from which the jury was
drawn. Richards v. State, 497 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973). Alabama employs the
standards of the county where the alleged offense occurred. Brazelton v. State, 8 Div. 342,
282 So. 2d 342 (Ala. Crim. App. 1973).
The implementation of a county-wide notion of decency raises several unanswered
questions in the area of venue. For example, if a party to an action moves for a change
of venue and the motion is granted, what local community standard of decency should
apply? Texas will direct a change in venue if the moving party can show that there is
great prejudice which precludes a fair and impartial trial in the county where trial was
commenced. Txx. R. Civ. PRo. 257 & 259 (1970). If the Richards notion of the community,
based upon the location from which the jury was drawn, is used, as opposed to that where
the offense was committed, then the "localness" concept as described in Miller is defeated.
The Supreme Court employed the local standard rational because of the divergence of
community tastes and the necessity for satisfying individual community needs. See notes
83-84 and accompanying text supra. Under the Richards approach, one community will
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cated in a recent case that the standard was to be measured by the
mores of a city, viz., the metropolitan area of Seattle. 144 The community
from which a standard is to be determined in New York is state-wide.145
In Georgia, a town's standard of decency was implemented to condemn
the movie Carnal Knowledge as obscene. 1 46 Soon after the Supreme
Court ruled that no nation-wide standard exists, the First Circuit em-
ployed a national standard in a federal forfeiture proceeding to find
that obscenity permeated the entire movie Deep Throat. As this pro-
ceeding was brought under a federal statute, and its effects would reach
all parts of a country well diversified in its attitudes, the court decided
a national standard of decency was required. 47
The courts are now caught in a quagmire of uncertainty. For state
courts the standard is limited to a state-wide basis, but may be "local"
and vary with respect to the chosen locality. As for federal courts, at
least when a federal statute is involved, a national standard is to be
used.14 If the practical results of the decisions be considered in deter-
be imposing a standard of decency upon another which may very well be different from
the standard of the original forum.
This problem of local community standards and venue also appears in federal practice.
In Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964), the Supreme Court held that if a change of
venue motion is granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970), the new forum must apply the
substantive law of the first forum. Therefore, in an obscenity case, the new forum would
apply the community standard of decency of the first forum. Again, the Supreme Court's
rationale that a local standard is necessary, because it is the only standard that a local
community could properly apply, is defeated.
144 State v. J-R Distributors, Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 584, 512 P.2d 1049 (1973) (en banc).
National community standards were rejected as too "hypothetical and unascertainable." Id.
at 1064. The local standard was deemed the most rational as it allowed the greatest flex-
ibility in meeting the diverse tastes and cultures of the different localities. Id. at 1065. The
court found, however, that the standard should not be based upon a "microscopic portion"
of the community, and rejected plaintiff's claim that such demonstrations would be quite
acceptable in the "red-light district" of the city. Id. at 1083. The court believed that such
a limited boundary would not be indicative of "community acceptance." Id.
145 People v. Heller, - N.Y.2d -, - N.E.2d -, - N.Y.S.2d - (1973). The state-wide
standard is to be determined by the appellate courts and applied uniformly throughout the
state.
146 Jenkins v. State, 230 Ga. 726, 199 S.E.2d 183 (1973), prob. juris. noted, 94 S. Ct. 719
(1973).
147 United States v. One Reel of Film, 481 F.2d 206, 208 n.2 (Ist Cir. 1973). The for-
feiture proceeding was instituted under 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1970).
The Fifth Circuit, even prior to Miller, had held that in obscenity cases brought under
federal statutes the standards would be that of the local community and not a country-
wide standard. The court relied heavily upon the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968,
28 U.S.C. § 1861 (Supp. 1972), to support its decision. The Act used the word community
to mean the area from which the jury should be selected. The jury should be a diverse
cross-section of the district. Hence, the court found it to be unreasonable to have a jury
assess matters of the conscience of a boundless community if they are purposefully drawn
from a restricted area. United States v. Groner, 479 F.2d 577, 582-83 (5th Cir. 1973). Accord,
United States v. One Reel of 35mm Color Motion Picture Film Entitled "Sinderella,"
Sherpix, Inc., - F.2d - (2d Cir. 1974).
148 See note 147 supra.
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mining optimal community size, it appears that a national standard of
decency is to be preferred. For example, in a highly publicized case
where a local community controlled the standard of decency, the film
Carnal Knowledge, which received wide critical acclaim both in the
movie industry and nation-wide, was condemned as obscene.149 Re-
cently, the Supreme Court consented to review this decision and reeval-
uate its obscenity guidelines.50 Even though a national standard ap-
pears least offensive to constitutional freedoms, it is most probable
that the Court will specifically locate the boundary of the community
according to state lines. This location will be consonant with the court's
concept of "localness" as the proper community standard.
Day to day mass communication functions on a nation-wide level.
Condemnation of films such as Carnal Knowledge has clearly endangered
national communication of ideas. A greater apprehension has been
expressed, however, of a more subtle interference that might result
from the local community concept. A chilling effect on freedom of
expression could touch virtually every nation-wide distributor of books,
magazines, or movies as well as local dealers, booksellers, and librarians.
There could result a tendency not to produce, distribute or exhibit
material where there could be even the slightest question as to its
acceptability, rather than risk criminal prosecution. 151
Doctrinal principles as to the importance of freedom of communi-
cation in a traditionally democratic atmosphere also indicate that a
national community standard is preferable. Anything less than a "so-
ciety at large" determination of obscenity, if such determination is
necessary at all, could lead to an extremely intolerable situation
whereby the cultural, intellectual, and educational achievements and
advancements of society depend upon an isolated sector of the com-
munity.152
149 Jenkins v. State, 230 Ga. 726, 199 S.E.2d 183, prob. juris. noted, 94 S. Ct. 719 (1973).
The dicta in Jacobellis to the effect that a local community standard will result in denial
of access to some parts of the country of materials found acceptable in other sections is no
longer prophesy. See 378 U.S. 184, 193 (1964).
150 94 S. Ct. 719 (1973). The questions to be considered on review are: (1) Is the Georgia
indecency statute unconstitutional? (2) Was the defendant denied due process by the state
court proceedings? (9) "Is it constitutionally permissible to employ 'local' as opposed to
state-wide, contemporary community standards in evaluating prurient interest appeal and
patent offensiveness of allegedly obscene material? (4) Is Carnal Knowledge obscene? 42
U.S.LIV. 3347 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1973) (No. 73-557).
151 See Trinkler v. Alabama, 94 S. Ct. 265, 266 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting). In West-
chester County, New York, the distributors and producers of the film The Devil in Miss
Jones have instituted a civil rights suit against the district attorney of the county for
seizing the film. Such suits may became a viable method by which dealers, producers, and
sellers may protect their interests in the face of either civil or criminal prosecution. N.Y.
Times, Oct. 30, 1973, at 49, col. 5.
152Jenkins v. State, 230 Ga. 726, 199 S.E.2d 183, 190, Prob. juris. noted, 94 S. Ct. 719
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Gauging the Mores of the Community
Once the relevant boundaries of the community are determined,
the community standard must be assessed. The Supreme Court failed
to suggest any suitable method by which lower courts may make this
determination. On a large scale basis, where many people would be
involved, e.g., in Manhattan, New York, it would be extremely difficult
to make this determination. 153 When the relevant community is ex-
tremely small, it may be appropriate to have the townspeople visit the
local adult book store or movie theater and report to the magistrate
their impressions of its contents. 54 The Supreme Court's guideline,
therefore, merits criticism not only for vagueness as to its substantive
description of obscenity, but also due to the vagueness of its procedure
for application.
The Value Element
The third requirement of the Miller test for obscenity is that the
work lack "serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value."'I5 5 The
(1973). The governmental or the self-censorship which appears to be occurring stagnates
the free flow of ideas. This would deny the majority of the national community the funda-
mental freedom to participate in the exchange of thoughts and culture and is, therefore,
repugnant to the very essence of the democratic tradition. Id.
153 See Redlich v. Capri Cinema, Inc., 347 N.Y.S.2d 811, 815-18, rev'd, 43 App. Div. 2d
27, 349 N.Y.S.2d 697 (1973). Policemen can visit the corner candy store and view the books
and magazines displayed, but will be unable, by this small scale effort, to get the full flavor
of the community's notion of decency. The great number of people in this geographic area,
with varying tastes and attitudes, also makes questionable the efficacy of the Miller Court's
reasoning in geographically limiting the boundary of the relevant community. Diversity of
attitudes and tastes throughout the country was the majority's justification for requiring
a less than national standard.
154 Phila. Inquirer, Oct. 26, 1973, at 1, col. 5. In Upper Merion, Pennsylvania, a suburb
of Philadelphia, the local justice, before he would close down the local adult book store,
invited the local residents to visit the store and report back to him with their impressions.
In Rockland County, New York, the Clarkstown town council formed an anti-obscenity
committee to investigate public displays and motion pictures in the area. The committee
mailed out more than 20,000 questionnaires to the local residents requesting their views
on pornography and censorship. Suit has been instituted in federal district court chal-
lenging the role and powers of this committee. N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1973, at 49, col. 3. If
other local committees begin to appear throughout the country, each sending out its own
questionnaires, cries of invasion of privacy and infringement of free speech are certain to
be heard. Another question as to the validity of these committees focuses around the con-
sideration of whether or not they are truly representative of community ideals. If a com-
mittee is publically elected perhaps it can be said that it represents majority opinion, but,
in Clarktown, the committee was appointed by other town officials.
155 An immediate impression would be that the Court again created a "marginal"
problem. According to all court decisions, hard-core pornography is definitely proscribed.
A problem arises because some works of the soft-core variety may conceivably have some
value element. Prosecutors may attack the latter to avoid creating a sub-category of ex-
ceptions. The possibility of encroachment upon first amendment guarantees is apparent.
If, however, a strict interpretation of the majority's value test is made, then this problem
should not arise. One type of necessary value used in Miller was the value of sexual con-
duct depictions for physicians or other related professionals. 413 U.S. at 16.
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Court omitted a fifth category of serious value, viz., educational
value. This value is an important one and its inclusion within the
guideline has been strongly recommended.150
Even under the value categories actually promulgated, there re-
mains the problem of determining what exactly is meant by "serious
value." It has been suggested that this does not mean simply any value,
but implies a test of quality. The question must then be asked: Is it a
"good" book or a "good" picture? If so, then the work has the requisite
value and is acceptable. If not, the material is obscene and prohibited.
The result of this quality test would improperly place upon the artist
the burden of establishing his innocence by proving the value of his
work.157
The degree of value necessary to pass muster under Miller was
left unanswered by the Court. In an attempt to establish some direction
in this area, it has been suggested that lack of value is indicated by
the presence of pandering in its distribution.)58 Under this approach,
the unanswered question posed by Memoirs reappears. Can pandering
be a determinative factor as to the social value of disseminated ma-
terial? Strong criticism has been levelled at the pandering rationale
because of its failure to alleviate the problem of vagueness of the value
element.159
The value element is also subject to criticism in that it calls upon
156 96th Meeting of the American Bar Ass'n, 13 CRIm. L. REP. 2415-16 (Aug. 8, 1973).
157 AmEiRcA, Aug. 18, 1973, at 83-84. One of the avowed purposes of the Miller revision
of standards was to enable the prosecutor to succeed more easily in his prosecution. People
v. Enskat, 33 Cal. App. 3d 900, 904, 109 Cal. Rptr. 433, 436 (1973). It is doubtful, however,
that the Court intended that the prosecutor be relieved of his burden of proof and that
it instead be placed upon the defendant. But see Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S.
49, 98 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan does not believe that the prosecutor
has in fact been seriously relieved of his burden. The Miller majority stressed that under
the Memoirs test the prosecutor had to "prove a negative," viz., that the work be "utterly
without redeeming social value," an almost impossible task. 413 US. 15, 22 (1973). Under
the Miller test, the prosecutor still must "prove a negative," he must show that the material
lacks serious value. Thus, it is not unlikely that the prosecutor's task remains as burden-
some as it was before Miller.
158 State v. J-R Distributors, Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 584, 512 P.2d 1049, 1061, 1066 (1973)
(en banc). The pandering rationale proceeds from the assumption that a book or movie
"commercially exploited for the sake of prurient interest" in disregard of any other in-
terest or value it might possess, establishes that the material is "utterly without redeeming
value." Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 420 (1966). See note 48 and accompanying
text supra.
The fact that certain materials were used in therapy treatment of sexually disoriented
persons, or that they were kept on file in supervised state depositories as examples of
what is obscene to aid police and the courts in their prosecutions, was held to be insuf-
ficient to show even some "modicum of social value," let alone the required serious value.
State v. J-R Distributors, Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 584, 512 P.2d 1049, 1061, 1066 (1973) (en banc).
159 See Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 427 (1966) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(there is no correlation between the social value of the book and the way in which it is
distributed); note 48 supra.
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the triers of the facts to make their own subjective determination. This
is so, even though the standard is clothed with such phrases as the
"average person." This is not an area of black-white differentiation,
of right versus wrong, but is one where ideas and thoughts bound up
with much emotion confront and conflict with one another.160 The un-
desirability of allowing subjectivity to determine the permissible scope
of expression has been discussed earlier in this note.' 61
Reviewing the Results
The Supreme Court's attempt to clarify the definition of obscenity
has fallen short of its goal. The vagueness of the Miller standard, ac-
companied by all the attendant evils of a loosely defined guideline, has
caused much confusion in the lower courts. These courts have side-
stepped the requirement of specificity, resulting in arbitrary action by
local police, prosecutors, and courts, e.g., book burnings in North
Dakota. The undefined community, although limited in that it is not
national, has led to both explicit and implicit censorship.16 2 The mass
communication industry continues to work under this chilling atmo-
sphere, knowing that its products may not only be banned in some of
the less "open-minded" parts of the country, but that its executives may
be subject to criminal sanctions as well.
The Supreme Court applied a balancing test, weighing the evil of
censorship against the evil of pornography, and concluded that obscen-
ity is the greater evil and must be controlled. The Court "presumed"
that pornography detrimentally affects the "quality of life and the total
community environment" even though conclusive scientific data is un-
available. 63 Considering the prevailing fundamental notions and tra-
160 Grigsby v. State, 14 CRm. L. REP. 2134 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 1973) (dis-
senting opinion). One reason why obscenity cannot properly be dealt with by the Court,
Justice Douglas believes, is that it involves personal tastes in literature. "What shocks me
may be sustenance for my neighbor. What causes one person to boil up in rage over one
pamphlet or movie may reflect only his neurosis, not shared by others," Miller v. Cali-
fornia, 413 U.S. 15, 40-41 (1973), for "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric." Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
The public display of the four-letter expletive of sexual intercourse in Cohen could
not be banned. Fundamental rights of free speech did not allow the condemnation of this
word as there is no way, the Court believed, that it could be distinguished from any other
offensive yet permissible word. Id. at 25. See Hess v. Indiana, 94 S. Ct. 326 (1973); note 141
sup-a.
161 See note 141 and accompanying text supra.
162 See notes 148-151 and accompanying text supra.
163 See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973). The Court, operating
under the assumption that there is an inherent evil in obscene material which undermines
societal life and morality, recognized the existence of a legitimate state interest to regulate
obscenity, including the exhibition of such materials to consenting adult viewers. The
state has a right to maintain a decent society. Id. at 59-60 (citations omitted). "States need
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ditions of freedom of expression in America, it is necessary to reconsider
whether or not obscenity is the greater evil. Even accepting the Court's
conclusion that pornography is undesirable, alternative approaches to
the Miller doctrine are available.
A BROADER PROSPECrVE
Pornography May Be Acceptable - The Brennan Approach
One possible alternative has been suggested by Justice Brennan:
Because of the failure of all earlier formulas and possibly any future
definitions of obscenity, and the great risk of encroachment upon con-
stitutional freedoms, censorship of obscenity is unacceptable except in
limited circumstances. Governmental suppression of pornographic ma-
terials cannot be upheld unless there is a substantial state interest.
When juveniles or unconsenting adults are involved, a legitimate state
concern is recognizable and state regulation, is allowed and war-
ranted.' 6
The utility of Justice Brennan's approach is questionable. If
formulations of obscenity are impossible because of the indefiniteness
of the concept itself,165 the task becomes no less difficult when juveniles
or unconsenting adults are involved. Pragmatic considerations also tend
to brand Justice Brennan's suggestion infeasible. How can willing
adults avail themselves of sexually oriented materials and still prevent
not wait until behavioral experts or educators can provide empirical data before enacting
controls of commerce in obscene materials." Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 120 (1973).
The Court, in its assumption, totally ignores the findings of the Commission on Pornog-
raphy and Obscenity. See note 164 infra.
16tParis Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 103, 113 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); Carlson v. Minnesota, 94 S. Ct. 263, 264 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Trinkler v.
Alabama, 94 S. Ct. 265, 268 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); West v. Texas, 94 S. Ct. 268,
269 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Cinema Classics, Ltd. v. Busch, 94 S. Ct. 269, 270
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
[Ait least in the absence of distribution to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to un-
consenting adults, the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the state and
federal governments from attempting wholly to suppress sexually oriented ma-
terials on the basis of their allegedly 'obscene' contents.
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 118 (1973).
This view is supported by the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography's recom-
mendations that governmental restraint on the distribution or exhibition of pornography
be limited to juveniles and unconsenting adults. REPORT OF TH COaras'N ON OascENrry
Am PotNocRA"Hy 57 (N.Y. Times ed. 1970). Justification for such restrictions when juveniles
are involved is based upon the lack of conclusive evidence as to the effect such exposure
to sexually explicit materials will have, and ethical difficulties in exposing this group to
the materials in order to make a conclusive determination. Id. at 63. As to the regulation
of materials in the case of unwilling adult recipients, this is allowable because of findings
that these materials are offensive to these people's sensibilities. Id. at 67. See 39 U.S.C.
§§ 3010-11; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1735-37 (1970). These acts allow recipients of sexually explicit
materials to authorize postal authorities to prevent delivery of such mail to them.
165 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 103 (1973).
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such materials from falling into the hands of juveniles or unsoliciting
adults? In Paris Adult Theatre I it was noted by the Court that con-
ceivably it is possible to have "adult" movie theaters whereby close
screening of patrons would prevent juveniles from being admitted.
The Court, however, further recognized that in the case of "adult"
book stores the screening method would not prevent juvenile exposure
to restricted materials as, although juveniles may be denied entrance to
the stores, the forbidden materials are still readily obtainable on the
outside.166
Pornography Cannot Be Censored - The Douglas Approach
A. The First Amendment Prohibits Censorship. The second al-
ternative, which is completely opposite to the majority proposition
that obscenity is definable and must be censored by the state is that
suggested by Justice Douglas. It is his belief that the first and fourteenth
amendment guarantees of freedom of expression prohibit all obscenity
regulation. The first amendment provision that "Congress shall make
no Law... abridging the Freedom of Speech, or of the Press...,,1,7 is
interpreted as an absolute blanket of protection. There is no mention
in the Constitution that in the case of obscene utterances, either oral
or written, such protection should not apply. Mr. Justice Douglas
strongly criticizes the courts' implicit reading into the Constitution of
an exception to this rule of law for obscenity.168
The primary purpose of the first and fourteenth amendments is to
permit the free flow of discussion and debate.169 They protect the
people's right to receive information and ideas, without regard to their
166 Id. at 58 n.7, relying on the Hill-Link Minority Report of the Commission on
Obscenity and Pornography which reported that the elderly and the young adolescent,
both female and male, were the best "customers" of pornography. REPORT OF THE COAiM'N
ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 401 (N.Y. Times ed. 1970).
It is theoretically possible to have state-supervised distribution of sexually explicit
materials by setting up "state stores," in much the same way liquor is distributed in some
jurisdictions. This, however, would only add additional burdens to already troubled munici-
palities. Moreover, it is not unreasonable to assume that the pornographic material sold
at these state stores would be easily obtainable by juveniles elsewhere. In addition, black
markets would probably appear to meet the demand.
167 US. CONsT. amend. 1.
168 See Justice Douglas' dissenting opinions in Miller v. California, 413 US. 15, 40-46
(1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 70-73 (1973); Roth v. New Jersey, 94
S. Ct. 271, 272 (1973); Cinema Classics, Ltd. v. Busch, 94 S. Ct. 269, 270 (1973); Byrne v.
Karalexis, 396 U.S. 976, 979 (1969); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 US. 413, 426; Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 513-14 (1957). Justice Douglas finds support in his view that no
exception be inferred, from the legal and social history of this country before and after
the inception of the Constitution when "off-color" materials always appeared without
restriction. United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm Film, 413 U.S. 123, 132-37 (1973)
(dissenting opinion).
169 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 44-45 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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social value; this right touches upon the very foundations of a free
society. 70 Justice Douglas argues that suppression of these rights is
censorship and if there is to be censorship of pornography, traditional
notions of democratic ideals dictate that there be full public debate
climaxed by constitutional amendment.171 The judiciary is not as re-
sponsive an organ of government as is the legislature. It is a very inap-
propriate branch of government to be entrusted with the responsibility
of determining what people can read or see, as obscenity is a subjective
determinationY 2
B. Censorship Is Thought Control. Suppression of obscenity has
been attacked as an attempt by the state to control the moral thoughts
of an individual. This society's prevailing notions of freedom do not
permit the state to "premise legislation on the desirability of control-
ling a person's private thoughts."'173 The state has no interest in con-
trolling the moral thoughts of an individual, nor the right to impose
the Court's set of values as to "good" literature upon others.174 This is,
170 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 107-08 (1973) (Brennan, J. dissenting);
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1966). "The First Amendment was designed to 'invite
dispute,' to induce 'a condition of unrest,' to 'create disatisfaction with conditions as they
are,' and even to stir 'people to anger.'" Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 44 (1973), quoting
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949). See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367 (1969), where the people's right to receive information was recognized by the Supreme
Court as one of high priority. In sustaining the validity of the FCC's "fairness doctrine,"
which requires that public issues be presented and that each side be given fair coverage,
the public's right to receive information was found superior to a broadcaster's right to
broadcast. Id.
171 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 46 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); People v.
Heller, - N.Y.2d -, - N.E.2d -, - N.Y.S.2d - (1973) (Wachtler, J., dissenting). Basic
democratic notions have always tended to reject censorship as "the deadly enemy of free-
dom and progress." Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 160 (1959) (Black, J., concurring).
Censorship reflects a society's lack of confidence in itself. It is a hallmark of an
authoritarian regime .... [The authors of the Constitution] believed a society
can be truly strong only when it is truly free. In the realm of expression they put
their faith . . . in the enlightened choice of the people .... [I]t is . . . the Con-
stitution [that] protects coarse expression as well as refined, and vulgarity no less
than elegance.
Ginsburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 498 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
172Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 159-60 (1959) (Blat.k, J., concurring). But cf.
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 187-90 (1964). The Supreme Court rejected the allegations
that it was acting as a "super-censor." It concluded that it was merely performing its
proper task of examining and delineating the scope of constitutionally protected freedom
of expression. Id.
173 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 108 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting),
quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 US. 557, 566 (1969).
174 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. at 49, 108 (1973) (Brennan J., dissenting);
United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm Film, 413 U.S. 123, 137 (1973) (Douglas,
J., dissenting); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565-66 (1969). Neither the courts nor the
legislature can control the minds of men. They cannot dictate to an individual what he
may read, dream, contemplate, visualize, or listen to so long as in the exercise and enjoy-
ment of these privileges no injury results to others. Grigsby v. State, 14 CIam. L. REP. 2134
(Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 1973) (Galbreath, J., dissenting). But see Paris Adult Theatre
I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67 (1973) wherein the Court attempts to defend its role as censor
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however, not to say that all forms of control over morality through
legislation are bad. Legislating morality at times is a necessary and
acceptable function of government. 1'75 The subjective and personal
nature of obscenity, however, does not make it amenable to this type
of control. 70 That human thoughts are affected by governmental censor-
ship should not be lightly dismissed as has been the Court's policy in
the past.177
C. Censorship Invades the Right of Privacy. Closely related to
the argument that censorship controls the minds and thoughts of indi-
viduals is the argument that such repression invades an individual's
right of privacy. The right of privacy, although not specifically men-
tioned in the Constitution, emanates from the protected rights as a
whole, because it is one of the "personal rights that can be deemed
fundamental . . . in the concept of ordered liberty."178
Under the influence of the right of privacy concept, the Supreme
Court, in Stanley v. Georgia, held unconstitutional a state statute which
made mere possession of obscene material in one's private home a
crime1 7 9 To hold otherwise, it was recognized, would permit a drastic
and dangerous invasion of personal freedoms, especially the right to be
free from unwarranted state interference in one's private life. 80 It has
been argued by some that the Stanley right to possession of obscenity,
in the privacy of one's home, gives rise to an ancillary right to buy,
by claiming it is not trying to control the intellectual or rational mind of an individual.
It alleges that control here involves the prohibition of matters which inherently lack any
serious, recognizable value such as legitimate communication.
175 Penal laws are based on this postulate. The Government's authority to control
drugs, United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 359-60 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring), prosti-
tution, Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917), and lotteries, Champion v. Ames,
188 U.S. 321 (1903), has been well recognized.
176See Grigsby v. State, 14 CRm. L. REP. 2134 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 1973)
(Galbreath J., dissenting).
The government, through its judiciary arm, is attempting to censor pornography in
much the same way the government, through its legislative branch, attempted to prohibit
alcohol during the prohibition era. The results of the prohibition efforts to legislate moral-
ity were, inter alia, that people suddenly developed a greater thirst. Similar results are
likely to follow censorship legislation. Those who would have chosen to see or read obscene
materials will continue to do so but, in addition, those who would not ordinarily be
attracted to such works will out of curiosity patronize its dealers, even if it means travelling
to a more permissive community to do so. See id.
177 See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67 (1973). Governmental suppres-
sion has been justified because censorship only incidentally affects human thoughts. These
indirect results do not obstruct the right of the state to protect its legitimate interests. Id.
178 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973), quoting Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). This right of privacy extends to protect the "personal intimacies
of the home, the family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child-rearing." 413 U.S.
49, 65 (1973).
179 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969).
180 Id. at 564-65.
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mail, transport, or import such materials.' 8 ' In rebuttal, the Supreme
Court has narrowly construed the Stanley right of privacy. The accept-
able boundary for permissable possession of obscene materials has not
been extended beyond one's home. Repeatedly, the Court has refused
to give rise to a correlative right to mail such materials,'8 2 to transport
them in interstate commerce, 8 3 or to import such materials from a
foreign country for commercial or personal use. 84 The Court has jus-
tified these refusals by adopting the attitude that the first amendment
does not give a protected right to do business in obscenity nor is there
a "'fundamental' privacy right 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty' " to watch, purchase, or otherwise disseminate it in a public
place. 18  Here, the suggestion to allow unpublicized dissemination may
be a satisfactory compromise.
Those who advocate the desirability of extending Stanley protec-
tion to the procurement of obscene matter for personal use in the home
argue that without such extension Stanley is void of any meaning. If
Stanley rights are to be preserved these ancillary rights must be granted;
otherwise, all the Stanleys will be relegated to enjoy their right of
privacy in their homes only with materials they, themselves, produce.'8 6
D. Pornography - A Matter of Individual Choice. Mr. Justice
Douglas, a strong opponent of censorship and first amendment infringe-
ment, views pornography as a matter of choice. Freedom of choice, to
purchase or not to purchase, to read or not to read such materials, is
thought to be a fundamental right exercisable by members of a free
society. This is not a "captive audience" situation wherein one is forced
181 United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm Film, 413 U.S. 123, 137 (1973) (Doug-
las, J., dissenting); Carlson v. Minnesota, 94 S. Ct. 263 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
182 United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971).
183 United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1972).
It is sufficient to reiterate the well-settled principle that Congress may impose
relevant conditions and requirements on those who use the channels of interstate
commerce in order that those channels will not become the means of promoting
or spreading evil, whether of a physical, moral or economic nature.
Id. at 144, quoting North Am. Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 705 (1946).
184 United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm Film, 413 U.S. 123, 128-29 (1973).
There are pragmatic considerations to forbid the importation for private use. Through
modern technology, a single copy imported under the guise of private use could quickly
be reproduced for sale on the open market. Id. See United States v. 37 Photographs, 402 U.S.
363 (1971).
185 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 (1973); United States v. Reidel, 402
U.S. 351, 356 (1971).
186 Carlson v. Minnesota, 94 S. Ct. 263 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); United States
v. 37 Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 382 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting).
Unless there is that ancillary right, one's Stanley rights could be realized, ...
only if one wrote or designed a tract in his attic and printed or processed it
in his basement so as to be able to read it in his study.
United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm Film, 413 U.S. 123, 137 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
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to look at or listen to that which he finds offensive. Those who pa-
tronize places which disseminate sexually explicit materials do so under
their own compulsion. 8 7 If materials were truly offensive to the com-
munity, there would be no need to prohibit their dissemination by gov-
ernmental restrictions because these works would be banned at the
market place - no consumer would purchase them. The market place
constantly stocks such materials because it knows buyers exist which
find them not only not patently offensive, but of sufficient worthiness
for purchase. 88
Under... [a] free enterprise system, an individual's choices in the
187 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 44 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see Public
Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
188 Trinkler v. Alabama, 94 S. Ct. 265 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Each week the
entertainment newspaper Variety publishes a listing of the top fifty money grossing films.
These movies are voluntarily given ratings by the Motion Picture Association of America to
forewarn prospective audiences of the movies' themes and contents. Film classification
depends upon the prominence of sex, violence, profanity, and crime, but heavy emphasis
is placed upon its sexual aspects, if any. A motion picture that receives a "G" rating will
have no vulgar language and no sexual matters other than a slight embrace or kiss, and all
ages are admitted. A "PG" movie will have some sexual implications, e.g., flashes of
nudity, vulgar language, and may have an anti-social theme; all ages are admitted but
parental guidance is suggested. If it is too anti-social, i.e., depicts adultery, a more severe
rating may be given. An "R" rated movie will contain partial nudity shots, sexual foreplay,
and an erotic theme, and persons under 17, unless accompanied by an adult guardian, are
not admitted. A film which concentrates exdusively on the erotic nature of the topic is
given an "X" rating and no one under 17 is admitted. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OB-
SCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 8-9 (N.Y. Times ed. 1970).
A breakdown of the top fifty money grossing films acording to film classification ap-
pears in Table I. A similar breakdown for the top ten grossing films is in Table II.
TABLE I
Top 50 GROSSING FILMS
Week X R PG G
Oct. 17, 1973 20% 36% 28% 16%
Oct. 24, 1973 18% 30% 38% 14%
Oct. 31, 1973 16% 28% 44% 12%
Nov. 1, 1973 12% 36% 42% 10%
TABLE II
Top 10 GROSSING FILMs
Week X R PG G
Oct. 17, 1973 20% 40% 30% 10%
Oct. 24, 1973 20% 20% 60% 0%
Oct. 31, 1973 20% 10% 60% 10%
Nov. 1, 1973 30% 20% 50% 10%
Variety, Oct. 17-Nov. 1, 1973.
Although this survey is based upon a one month period it is indicative of the general
tastes and desires of the movie-going community. A spokesman for the Motion Picture
Association of America suggests that the "X" and "R" rating percentages for the above
time period are lower than usual because of the proximity of holidays -a time when
film-makers market more "family-type" movies.
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market place are respected, however unwise they may seem to some-
one else. It is not the business of a court... to make its own critical
evaluation of those choices and protect only the ones that ... [it
deems] are "necessary."' 18 9
If people want to see pornographic films or read pornographic
literature why is it necessary to suppress these desires? The government
has adjudged sexually explicit material bad for society. It has felt it
necessary to supersede the market in determining the accessibility of
pornography. If pornography is bad for society, then the government
should act to suppress it within the constraints of the Constitution.
However, the effects of pornography on society are debatable. Further-
more, there may be other areas of public expression that are more
harmful than pornography and require more governmental concern
than does pornography. If governmental suppression of pornography
is based on its recognition of one group's wishes as opposed to another's,
then this weighing of importance must be explained and its constitu-
tionality taken into account. The courts, however, have not followed
this prescription. State regulation is permitted because it is presumed
that obscenity is harmful to society in that it will cause a general break-
down in its morality and eventually of society itself.190
189 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91 (1972). The enactment of the Federal Anti-Pander-
ing Act, 39 U.S.C. §§ 3010-11 (1970), in 1968, and the subsequent enactment of the Postal
Reorganization Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1735-37 (1970), in 1970, demonstrate the Government's cog-
nizance of the fact that individual choice can be effectively employed to control the
dissemination of obscenity. Under these Acts, a recipient of an unwanted sexually explicit
mail advertisement can refuse to accept it. The recipient can also request postal authorities
to maintain his name on a list of those who choose not to be subjected to such offensive
materials. In Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970), the Court rejected the claim
by the mailers of erotic advertisements that the Anti-Pandering Act infringed upon their
freedom of speech and sustained its validity. The recipient is allowed to reject the material
which he "in his sole discretion believes to be erotically arousing or sexually provocative."
Id. at 730. In this instance, the Court recognized the inherent subjective nature of obscenity
and left the determination of suppression to the individual, rather than the community.
The mailer's constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression were found subordinate
to the individual's choice to be left alone. Id. at 736.
The Supreme Court has recognized that freedom of choice extends into other areas of
freedom of expression. In Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943), a town's anti-bell-
ringing ordinance was held unconstitutional not only because it effectively prohibited
the dissemination of religious views, but also because it substituted the choice of the
community as to what should be heard in place of the individual's own.
190 Kaplan v. United States, 413 U.S. 115, 120 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49, 60-61 (1973). Conclusive empirical evidence is not necessary, and states, based upon
this presumption, can proceed with their prohibitions. The lawmakers rely upon "common
sense" knowledge.
The sumof experience . . .affords an ample basis for legislatures to conclude
that a sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central to family life,
community welfare, and the development of human personality, can be debased
and distorted by crass commercial exploitation of sex.
413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973). The Court relies upon the tradition of civilized nations wherein
law-makers' passage of laws is sometimes based upon unprovable assumptions. See Citizens
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Is Pornography Harmful?
It is necessary for the Supreme Court to reevaluate the accuracy of
its presumption that obscenity is harmful to society before allowing
states to control expression. Although the findings are not conclusive,
there is evidence available which tends to refute the "common sense"
value judgment made by the courts and legislatures that pornography
is harmful. The Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornog-
raphy acknowledged that exposure to erotic materials does cause sexual
arousal, but it concluded that an individual's behavior was not sub-
stantially altered as a result of such exposure. 191 The Commission re-
ported that there is no evidence which shows that exposure to sexually
oriented materials plays a substantial part in the causation of criminal
behavior, including sex crimes and delinquency, among youths and
adults. 192
On the other hand, there are those who believe that exposure to
erotic material is detrimental to society. The Minority Report of the
Commission on Obscenity and Pornography found that pornography
does have "an eroding effect on society, on public morality, on respect
for human worth, on attitude toward family love, on culture.' 1 93 The
Minority Report also cites evidence showing that exposure to pornog-
raphy does influence potential sex offenders. 94
In its approach, the Supreme Court has relied on the latter theory
which holds obscenity to be harmful, notwithstanding that there is at
least equally ample evidence to substantiate the opposite viewpoint.
Instead of employing all its energy to eradicate the alleged evil, the
Court would best call for legislative efforts in the nature of definitive
and conclusive studies to determine the true effects of pornography
before approving statutes which endanger first amendment rights. A
law concerning obscenity cannot be based purely on an assumption that
to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (regulation of the use of the
environment); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (regulation of commercial affairs);
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963) (regulation of securities).
191 REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 24-25 (N.Y. Times ed.
1970).
192 Id. at 27. The Commission recommended that the government cease further inter-
ference with the freedom of consenting adults to obtain the materials they wished. Id. at 51.
The erotic materials were found to be a source of entertainment and information to many
adults, i.e., their appeal to the prurient interest supplied their socially redeeming value.
Such materials also served as a beneficial aid to "facilitate constructive communication"
between marriage partners. See M. GOLDSTEIN & H. KANT, PORNOGRAPHY AND SEXUAL
DEVIANCE 150-53 (1973); Murphy, The Value of Pornography, 10 WAYNE L. REv. 655 (1964).
193 HILL-LINK MINORITY REPORT OF THE COMA'N ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 458
(N.Y. Times ed. 1970).
194 Id. at 47.
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it is bad. There must be a greater assimilation of science, sociology, and
psychology into the law.
It is difficult to explain why law-makers focus so strongly upon
obscenity and why they insist upon imposing their moral value judg-
ments on the many who do not agree with them. It is ironic that the
government finds sexual obscenity glaringly in need of suppression,
while at the same time the problem of violence in the media is seldom
confronted.
Violence
There is an increasing recognition of the adverse effects of mass
media portrayals of violence on the values, attitudes, and behavior of
society. The studies of the National Commission on the Causes and
Prevention of Violence reported a link between the glorification of
violence in the media and the American preoccupation with violence.
Violence on television, for instance, does have ill effects upon its audi-
ences, especially the young. The impact is upon the learning process in
that it teaches children a set of moral and social values about violence
which is not consistent with the values of a civilized society1 95 The
Violence Commission recommended that a new approach be taken
whereby media programming redirect its efforts away from the dramatic
emphasis upon violence and aim toward the development of cultural,
educational, and non-violent dramatic programming.1 6
Violence seems more acceptable to law-makers than erotica, de-
spite the conclusions reached by both governmental commissions. This
disorientation of priorities may prove untenable in the future, espe-
cially if violent sublimation is one of its consequences.
CONCLUSION
The essence of the Miller decision is the allocation to the local
community of the power to determine obscenity. Prior to the Miller
decision, concepts such as the "average person" were used; however, the
Miller Court recognized that the average citizen may differ among vary-
ing communities. This left a question as to the optimal size of the com-
munity which was to be the foundation of the relevant obscenity
standard. The Supreme Court ruled that if states so desire they may
regulate obscenity within their boundaries. Problems of local autonomy
of communities within a state have not yet been resolved.
195 FINAL REPORT OF THE NAT'L COmiM'N ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE
160-66 (1971). Violence encourages violence and fosters ideas which are unacceptable in a
socialized and civilized society. Id. at 169-70.
196 Id. at 172-74.
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There is still a great deal of vagueness in the new legal definition
of obscenity. The components of the definition are now left to the
interpretation of "local" communities. Which person or group of peo-
ple should be entrusted with this determination is problematic. If the
views of a community are relatively homogeneous, an otherwise difficult
task may be alleviated. However, it has not yet been determined what
size community might, in fact, be regarded as homogeneous in outlook,
or what would be the implications of a great diversity of obscenity laws
on an issue touching all of American society. In general, the Supreme
Court decision is intended to give prosecutors and the police more
power to deter the dissemination of pornography. 197
If there are, in fact, no socially detrimental effects of pornography,
then there is no reason why the free marketplace should not determine
the extent of its dissemination, under the constraint that those unin-
terested should not be forced to experience it.198 However, if socially
detrimental effects of pornography do exist and they are not eliminated
in the market, then some sort of extra-market regulation would be
desirable. This extrinsic regulation may also be desirable if there exists
a distinguishable group in the community whose desires are deemed
by society superior to all others, and which looks unfavorably on the
dissemination of pornography. While this nation has experienced the
influence of dominating groups in its history (with or without social
approval), e.g., during Prohibition, their dominating influence would
appear contradictory to the stated goals of American society as expressed
in the Constitution. However, proceeding upon an assumption that
some forms of obscenity are harmful, the Court has felt justified in
retaining power to define and allow extra-market control over pornog-
raphy.199
The question then remains - what are the true effects of pornog-
raphy on American society? Further efforts must be made to arrive at a
definitive answer. It may very well be that the detrimental effects of
pornography are not nearly as severe as the Supreme Court presumes
them to be. Growing realization of this, as well as increasing difficulty
in defining appropriate communities, threatens to undermine the
Miller Court's decision concerning the regulation of pornography in
the United States.
Beverly G. Miller
197 See notes 122, 175 and accompanying text supra.
198 See notes 187-91 and accompanying text supra.
199 See notes 190, 193-94 and accompanying text supra.
